http://www.pacificwar.org.au/JapWarCrimes/TenWarCrimes/Rape_Nanking.html
THE RAPE OF NANKING OR NANJING MASSACRE (1937)

The Japanese invasion of China in 1937

Having already seized and annexed China's Manchurian region (1931) and Jehol province (1933), the Japanese were waiting for a pretext to invade and occupy the whole of China. That pretext came in July 1937, when tensions between Chinese troops and Japanese troops engaged in military exercises on occupied Chinese territory produced an exchange of firing near Peking (now Beijing). The Japanese used this incident as an excuse to wage all out war against China.
external image BurialAliveatNanking.jpg

BURIAL ALIVE AT NANKING (NANJING) 1937

Chinese at Nanking (now known as Nanjing) are being buried alive by grinning Japanese troops who are competing with each other to invent new and more horrible ways to kill Chinese whom they regarded as sub-human. This photograph was taken by a Japanese and processed in a Japanese-owned photographic shop. A Chinese photographic technician made copies that were smuggled out of China.
Japanese armies invaded China's northern provinces and quickly captured the ancient Chinese capital Peking (now called Beijing). In the conduct of this war, the Japanese adopted a policy of deliberate savagery in the expectation that it would break the will of the Chinese to resist. Although poorly trained and equipped, the Chinese army and communist irregulars put up strong resistance to Japan's armies which enjoyed overwhelming superiority in numbers, training, and weapons. The Japanese troops responded to Chinese resistance to their invasion by embarking on an orgy of murder, rape, and looting that shocked the civilised world at that time, although it has now been largely forgotten in many Western countries where the rigorous teaching of history is becoming a neglected discipline.
While fighting was continuing in northern China, the Japanese launched a second front at the city of Shanghai on the eastern coast of China. Despite determined resistance by Chinese Nationalist troops, the Japanese captured Shanghai in November, 1937. As if to make an exhibition of their brutality to the Western world, the Japanese marched hundreds of Chinese prisoners of war down to the Bund, or river bank, and slaughtered them by machine-gun in full view of horrified observers aboard foreign ships moored in the river. Having captured Shanghai, the Japanese were then able to move up the Yangtze River and lay siege to the Nationalist capital Nanking (now called Nanjing).
It is not possible to document here the full extent of the horrors experienced by China at the hands of the Japanese between 1937 and 1945. Those who are interested in a detailed treatment of this terrible episode in China's history will find it in the books of Lord Russell of Liverpool, Iris Chang and Laurence Rees that are mentioned at the end of this chapter. I will mention here only the Rape of Nanking (now called the Nanjing Massacre) which is the best documented of Japanese atrocities in China owing to the presence of Western observers who were eyewitnesses to the mass slaughter, rape and looting that the Japanese inflicted on the unfortunate population of the Chinese capital.

The Japanese murder, rape, loot, and burn in Nanking (Nanjing) 1937

The Japanese were infuriated by the strength of Chinese resistance, and when China's Nationalist capital Nanking fell in December 1937, Japanese troops immediately slaughtered thousands of Chinese soldiers who had surrendered to them. The Japanese then rounded up about twenty thousand young Chinese men and transported them in trucks outside the city walls where they were killed in a massive slaughter. Japanese troops were then encouraged by their officers to loot Nanking, and slaughter and rape the Chinese population of the city.
For six weeks, life for the Chinese in Nanking became a nightmare. Bands of drunken Japanese soldiers roamed the city, murdering, raping, looting, and burning at whim. Chinese civilians who were stopped on the street, and found to possess nothing of value, were immediately killed. At least twenty thousand Chinese women were raped in Nanking during the first four weeks of the Japanese occupation, and many were mutilated and killed when the Japanese troops were finished with them.
The Japanese troops were encouraged by their officers to invent ever more horrible ways to slaughter the Chinese population of the city. When the bodies of murdered Chinese choked the streets and the gutters ran red with their blood, the Japanese were forced to refine their methods of slaughter in the interest of preventing the spread of disease. Batches of Chinese civilians were rounded up and herded into slaughter pits. Here the grinning Japanese soldiers would either bury them alive, hack them to death with their swords, use them for bayonet practice, or pour petrol on the victims and burn them alive. The bodies of thousands of victims of the slaughter were dumped into the Yangtze River until the river was red with their blood. After looting Nanking of anything of value, the Japanese started fires that gutted one third of the city.
Independent foreign observers of the Rape of Nanking, including a German businessman and Nazi Party member named John Rabe, were appalled to see Chinese civilians, both men and women, the elderly, and tiny children, put to death by Japanese troops with horrifying brutality. Rabe tried to save as many Chinese as he could by creating a safety zone on his estate. He appealed to Adolf Hitler to intervene, but the Nazi leader rebuffed his appeal. Convincing independent proof of the horrifying scale of the Japanese massacre at Nanking emerged in 1996 with the publication of John Rabe's diary record of the massacre.
Japanese soldiers appeared to be quite willing to be photographed with raised swords beside their intended victims, in the act of bayoneting their victims, and posing with their dead victims in the slaughter pits. The atrocities committed by Japanese troops at Nanking were widely publicised by foreign observers, including newspaper correspondents. When the Japanese high command became aware of the full scope of the horror perpetrated by Japanese troops at Nanking, it went to considerable lengths to destroy evidence of the atrocity.
Iris Chang gives a very detailed account of the extent and appalling nature of the Japanese atrocities in Nanking in her book "The Rape of Nanking" (published 1997). The horrifying photographs in her book survived the attempt by the Japanese high command to cover up the Nanking atrocities because the perpetrators entrusted the "happy snaps" recording their vile behaviour to a Japanese-owned photographic shop in Shanghai for processing. A Chinese employee secretly made extra copies and smuggled them out of China.
CAUTION: Iris Chang's excellent history of the Rape of Nanking contains very disturbing text and photographs. This web-site does not recommend that it be read by young children.

The judges of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (also known as the Tokyo War Crimes Trials) were prepared to accept that at least 200,000 Chinese civilians and prisoners of war were slaughtered by the Japanese in the six weeks after Nanking fell. The judges were also prepared to accept that the death toll would be much higher if estimates of the number of Chinese burned alive by the Japanese in mass slaughter pits and bodies dumped in the river were added. Non-Japanese historians are prepared to accept that the slaughter at Nanking could have reached as high as 370,000 victims.
The appalling brutality displayed by Japanese troops at Nanking was by no means unique. It has been estimated by historians that several million Chinese civilians and prisoners of war were murdered in the course of Japan's undeclared war on China between 1937 and 1945.
Despite photographic and independent eyewitness evidence, the Japanese government still refuses to acknowledge or permit Japanese schoolchildren to be told the full story of the slaughter, rape and looting that took place at Nanking in 1937. In recent years, the Japanese government has made a small concession to the weight of international and local criticism of this censorship by permitting brief and vague references in history textbooks to the Rape of Nanking (Nanjing Massacre), but the atrocities are described as the "Nanjing Incident" and the text suggests that the victims died during the battle for the city, and not in a horrifying massacre that took place during the six weeks that followed the fall of the city to the Japanese.
Even these small concessions to historical truth are now coming under attack in Japan from militarists and neo-nationalists. The neo-nationalists, who include Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, prominent members of Japan's parliament, and senior academics such as Professor Nobukatsu Fujioka of Tokyo University, believe that these concessions have gone too far, and that school textbooks should be censored to delete all references to Japanese war guilt and atrocities, and to instil national pride rather than shame.
Students of history interested in pursuing this aspect of a particularly brutal war may wish to examine the books and web-sites listed at the end of this chapter.


This information has come from:
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Second_Sino-Japanese_War

Second Sino-Japanese War


Second Sino-Japanese War
Part of World War II
Map showing the extent of Japanese control in 1940
Map showing the extent of Japanese control in 1940

Map showing the extent of Japanese control in 1940.

Date
July 7, 1937–September 9, 1945 (minor fighting since 1931)
Location
China
Result
Japanese unconditional surrender
Casus
belli
Marco Polo Bridge Incident.
Territorial
changes
Retrocession to China of Manchuria, Taiwan and Pescadores

Combatants
Flag of Republic of China
Flag of Republic of China
China
Flag of United States
Flag of United States
United States
1
Flag of Empire of Japan
Flag of Empire of Japan
Empire of Japan
Collaborationist Chinese Army2
Commanders
Flag of Republic of China
Flag of Republic of China
Chiang Kai-shek
,
Flag of Republic of China
Flag of Republic of China
Chen Cheng,
Flag of Republic of China
Flag of Republic of China
Yan Xishan,
Flag of Republic of China
Flag of Republic of China
Feng Yuxiang,
Flag of Republic of China
Flag of Republic of China
Li Zongren,
Flag of Republic of China
Flag of Republic of China
Xue Yue,
Flag of Republic of China
Flag of Republic of China
Bai Chongxi,
Flag of Republic of China
Flag of Republic of China
Peng Dehuai,
Flag of United States
Flag of United States
Joseph Stilwell,
Flag of United States
Flag of United States
Claire Chennault,
Flag of United States
Flag of United States
Albert Wedemeyer
Flag of Empire of Japan
Flag of Empire of Japan
Hirohito
,
Flag of Empire of Japan
Flag of Empire of Japan
Fumimaro Konoe,
Flag of Empire of Japan
Flag of Empire of Japan
Hideki Tojo,
Flag of Empire of Japan
Flag of Empire of Japan
Kotohito Kan'in,
Flag of Empire of Japan
Flag of Empire of Japan
Matsui Iwane,
Flag of Empire of Japan
Flag of Empire of Japan
Hajime Sugiyama,
Flag of Empire of Japan
Flag of Empire of Japan
Shunroku Hata,
Flag of Empire of Japan
Flag of Empire of Japan
Toshizo Nishio,
Flag of Empire of Japan
Flag of Empire of Japan
Yasuji Okamura,
Flag of Empire of Japan
Flag of Empire of Japan
Umezu Yoshijiro,
Strength
5,600,000 Chinese
700+ US aircraft
3,200,000 Japanese,
900,000 Chinese collaborators[1]
Casualties
3,220,000 military,
17,530,000 civilians
1,900,000 military (including 480,000 KIA)
1 On July 1942, the Flying Tigers became an official United States Army Air Force unit.
2 Various Japanese puppet regimes provided significant manpower to support the Japanese occupation.
The Second Sino-Japanese War (July 7, 1937-September 9, 1945) was a major war fought between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan before and during World War II.

It was the largest Asian war in the twentieth century.[2]
Although the two countries had fought intermittently[on and off] since 1931, full-scale war started in earnest in 1937 and ended only with the surrender of Japan in 1945. The war was the result of a decades-long Japanese imperialist policy aiming to dominate China politically and militarily to secure its vast raw material reserves and other resources.
At the same time, the rising tide of Chinese nationalism and notions of self determination [being able to rule themselves] stoked the coals of war.
Before 1937, China and Japan fought in small, localized engagements in so-called "incidents." Yet, the two sides, for a variety of reasons, refrained from fighting a total war.
The 1931 invasion of Manchuria by Japan is known as the "Mukden Incident." The last of these incidents was the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, marking the official beginning of full scale war between the two countries.
The invasion was condemned and declared illegal by the League of Nations but, as with the Italian occupation of Ethiopia from 1935, the League of Nations was not able to enforce any sanctions.
From 1937 to 1941, China fought alone.
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Second Sino-Japanese War merged into the greater conflict of World War II. Japan, like Italy, was late in launching its extra-territorial imperial project. This was not an expression of the will of the people, but of the militaristic leaders of the nation at the time.
However, it was also an assertion of Japan's status as a power in her own right. Having successfully warded off the interference by the European colonial powers of the U.S., she now aspired to become an imperial power in the image of those who had tried to dominate her, so blame for atrocities that were committed ought properly to be shared. All imperial powers, including those who censured Japan's actions as immoral, have committed crimes against humanity.

Contents

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Nomenclature

In Chinese, the war is most commonly known as the War of Resistance Against Japan, and also known as the Eight Years' War of Resistance, or simply War of Resistance.
In Japan, the name Japan-China War is most commonly used because of its neutrality. When the war began in July 1937 near Beijing, the government of Japan used North China Incident, Hokushi Jihen), and with the outbreak of war in Central China next month, it was changed to China Incident, Shina Jihen).
The word incident, jihen) was used by Japan as neither country had declared war on each other. Japan wanted to avoid intervention by other countries such as the United Kingdom and particularly the United States, which had been the biggest steel exporter to Japan. American President Franklin D. Roosevelt would have had to impose an embargo due to the Neutrality Acts had the fighting been named a war.
In Japanese propaganda however, the invasion of China became a "holy war" (seisen), the first step of the Hakko ichiu (eight corners of the world under one roof). In 1940, prime minister Konoe thus launched the League of Diet Members Believing the Objectives of the Holy War. When both sides formally declared war in December 1941, the name was replaced by Greater East Asia War, Daitōa Sensō).
Although the Japanese government still uses "China Incident" in formal documents, because the word //Shina// is considered a derogatory word by China, media in Japan often paraphrase with other expressions like The Japan-China Incident (Nikka Jihen, Nisshi Jihen), which were used by media even in the 1930s.
Also, the name Second Sino-Japanese War is not usually used in Japan, as the First Sino-Japanese War, Nisshin-Sensō), between Japan and the Qing Dynasty in 1894 is not regarded to have obvious direct linkage with the second, between Japan and the Republic of China.

Background

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Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek announced the Kuomintang policy of resistance against Japan at Lushan on July 10, 1937, three days after the Battle of Lugou Bridge.

The origin of the Second Sino-Japanese War can be traced to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, in which China, then under the Qing Dynasty, was defeated by Japan and was forced to cede Taiwan and recognize the independence of Korea in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Qing Dynasty was on the brink of collapse from internal revolts and foreign imperialism, while Japan had emerged as a great power through its effective measures of modernization. The Republic of China was founded in 1912, following the Xinhai Revolution which overthrew the Qing Dynasty. However, the nascent Republic was even weaker than its predecessor because of the dominance of warlords. Unifying the nation and repelling imperialism seemed a very remote possibility. Some warlords even aligned themselves with various foreign powers in an effort to wipe each other out. For example, warlord Zhang Zuolin of Manchuria openly cooperated with the Japanese for military and economic assistance. It was during the early period of the Republic that Japan became the greatest foreign threat to China.
In 1915, Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands to further its political and commercial interests in China. Following World War I, Japan acquired the German sphere of influence in Shandong. China under the Beiyang government remained fragmented and unable to resist foreign incursions until the Northern Expedition of 1926-28, launched by the Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) in Guangzhou against various warlords. The Northern Expedition swept through China until it was checked in Shandong, where Beiyang warlord Zhang Zongchang, backed by the Japanese, attempted to stop the Kuomintang Army from unifying China. This situation culminated in the Jinan Incident of 1928 in which the Kuomintang army and the Japanese were engaged in a short conflict. In the same year, Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin was also assassinated when he became less willing to cooperate with Japan. Following these incidents, the Kuomintang government under Chiang Kai-shek finally succeeded in unifying China in 1928.

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Japanese troops entering Shenyang during Mukden Incident.

Still, numerous conflicts between China and Japan persisted as Chinese nationalism had been on the rise and one of the ultimate goals of the Three Principles of the People was to rid China of foreign imperialism. However, the Northern Expedition had only nominally unified China, and civil wars broke out between former warlords and rival Kuomintang factions. In addition, the Chinese Communists revolted against the central government following a purge of its members. Because of these situations, the Chinese central government diverted much attention into fighting these civil wars and followed a policy of "first internal pacification before external resistance." This situation provided an easy opportunity for Japan to further its goals. In 1931, the Japanese invaded Manchuria right after the Mukden Incident. After five months of fighting, in 1932, the puppet state Manchukuo was established with the last emperor of China, Puyi, installed as its head of state. Unable to challenge Japan directly, China appealed to the League of Nations for help. The League's investigation was published as the Lytton Report, which condemned Japan for its incursion of Manchuria, and led Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations. From the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, appeasement was the policy of the international community and no country was willing to take an active stance other than a weak censure. Japan saw Manchuria as a limitless supply of raw materials and as a buffer state against the Soviet Union.
Incessant conflicts followed the Mukden Incident. In 1932, Chinese and Japanese soldiers fought a short war in the January 28 Incident. The war resulted in the demilitarization of Shanghai, which forbade the Chinese from deploying troops in their own city. In Manchukuo there was an ongoing campaign to defeat the volunteer armies that arose from the popular frustration at the policy of nonresistance to the Japanese. In 1933, the Japanese attacked the Great Wall region, and in its wake the Tanggu Truce was signed, which gave Japan the control of Rehe province and a demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and Beiping-Tianjin region. The Japanese aim was to create another buffer region, this time between Manchukuo and the Chinese Nationalist government whose capital was Nanjing.
In addition, Japan increasingly utilized the internal conflicts among the Chinese factions to reduce their strength one by one. This was precipitated by the fact that even some years after the Northern Expedition, the political power of the Nationalist government only extended around the Yangtze River Delta region, and other regions of China were essentially held in the hands of regional powers. Thus, Japan often bought off or created special links with these regional powers to undermine the efforts of the central Nationalist government in bringing unity to China. To do this, Japan sought various Chinese collaborators and helped these men lead governments that were friendly to Japan. This policy was called the Specialization of North China (Chinese: 華北特殊化; pinyin: húaběitèshūhùa), or more commonly known as the North China Autonomous Movement. The northern provinces affected by this policy were Chahar, Suiyuan, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shandong.
This Japanese policy was most effective in the area of what is now Inner Mongolia and Hebei. In 1935, under Japanese pressure, China signed the He-Umezu Agreement, which forbade the KMT from conducting party operations in Hebei. In the same year, the Ching-Doihara Agreement was signed and vacated the KMT from Chahar. Thus, by the end of 1935, the Chinese central government had virtually vacated North China. In its place, the Japanese-backed East Hebei Autonomous Council and the Hebei-Chahar Political Council were established. There in the vacated area of Chahar the Mongol Military Government was formed on May 12, 1936 with Japan providing military and economic aid. This government tried to take control of Suiyuan in late 1936 and early 1937 but was defeated. Immediately after the successful outcome of this campaign the Xi'an Incident occurred resulting temporarily in the end of the Chinese Civil War and the forming of a United Front of the CPC and KMT against Japan on December 24, 1936.

Japan's invasion of China

external image 200px-Casualties_of_a_mass_panic_-_Chungking%2C_China.jpgexternal image magnify-clip.png
Casualties of a mass panic during a June 1941 Japanese bombing of Chongqing. More than 5000 civilians died during the first two days of air raids in 1939.[3]

Most historians place the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937, at the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, when a crucial access point to Beijing was assaulted by the Japanese. Some Chinese historians, however place the starting point at the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931. Following the Mukden Incident, the Japanese Kwantung Army occupied Manchuria and established the puppet state of Manchukuo on February 18 1932. Japan tried forcing the Chinese government to recognize the independence of Manchukuo. However, when the League of Nations determined that Manchukuo was a product of Japanese aggression, Japan withdrew from the League.
Following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937, the Japanese occupied Shanghai, Nanjing and Southern Shanxi in campaigns involving approximately 350,000 Japanese soldiers, and considerably more Chinese soldiers. Historians estimate up to 300,000 people perished in the Nanking Massacre, after the fall of Nanjing on December 13, 1937, while some Japanese historians denied the existence of a massacre at all. The height of Japanese army advance culminated in capturing the city of Wuhan.
Aerial combat between the Chinese Air Force and the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy Air Forces began in earnest in August 1937. By the end of 1940 the Chinese air force was effectively wiped out because China lacked the technological, industrial and military infrastructure to replace aircraft lost during combat. Throughout the next few years, the Imperial air force of the Navy and the Army launched the world's first massive air bombing raids of civilian targets on nearly every major city in China, leaving millions dead, injured, and homeless.
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident not only marked the beginning of an open, undeclared, war between China and Japan, but also hastened the formation of the Second United Front between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The cooperation took place with salutary effects for the beleaguered CCP. The high point of the cooperation came in 1938 during the Battle of Wuhan. However, the distrust between the two antagonists was scarcely veiled. The uneasy alliance began to break down by late 1938, despite Japan's steady territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the rich Yangtze River Valley in central China. After 1940, open conflict between the Nationalists and Communists became more frequent in the areas outside Japanese control, culminating in the New Fourth Army Incident. The Communists expanded their influence wherever opportunities were presented, through mass organizations, administrative reforms, land and tax reform measures favoring peasants, while the Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of Communist influence and fight the Japanese at the same time.

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Japanese marines at Guangdong in the Battle of Wuhan.

The Japanese implemented a strategy of creating friendly puppet governments favorable to Japanese interests in the territories conquered. However, the atrocities committed by the Japanese army made these governments very unpopular and ineffective. The Japanese did succeed in recruiting and forming a large Collaborationist Chinese Army to maintain public security in the occupied areas.
By 1940, the fighting had reached a stalemate. While Japan held most of the eastern coastal areas of China and Vietnam, guerrilla fighting continued in the conquered areas. The Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek struggled on from a provisional capital at the city of Chongqing. China, with its low industrial capacities and limited experience in modern warfare, could not launch any decisive counter-offensive against Japan. Chiang could not risk an all-out campaign given the poorly-trained, under-equipped, and disorganized state of his armies and opposition to his leadership both within Kuomintang and in China at large. He had lost a substantial portion of his best trained and equipped army defending Shanghai and was at times at the mercy of his generals, who maintained a high degree independence from the central KMT government. On the other hand, Japan had suffered tremendous casualties from unexpectedly stubborn resistance in China and already developed problems in administering and garrisoning the seized territories. Neither side could make any swift progress in a manner resembling the fall of France and Western Europe to Nazi Germany.

Chinese resistance strategy

external image 300px-Chinese_soldiers_1939.jpgexternal image magnify-clip.png
Chinese soldiers march to the front in 1939.

The basis of Chinese strategy during the war can be divided into three periods:
First Period: July 7, 1937 (Battle of Lugou Bridge)–October 25, 1938 (Fall of Wuhan).
Unlike Japan, China was unprepared for total war and had little military-industrial strength, no mechanized divisions, and few armored forces. Up until the mid-1930s China had hoped that the League of Nations would provide countermeasures to Japan's aggression. In addition, the Kuomintang government was mired in a civil war against the Communists, as Chiang was famously quoted: "The Japanese are a disease of the skin, the Communists are a disease of the heart." Though the Communists formed the New Fourth Army and the 8th Route Army which were nominally under the command of the National Revolutionary Army, the United Front was never truly unified, as each side was preparing for a showdown with the other once the Japanese were driven out.
Even under these extremely unfavorable circumstances, Chiang realized that in order to win the support from the United States or other foreign nations, China must prove that it was indeed capable of fighting. A fast retreat would discourage foreign aid so Chiang decided to make a stand in the Battle of Shanghai. Chiang sent the best of his German-trained divisions to defend China's largest and most industrialized city from the Japanese. The battle lasted over three months saw heavy casualties on both sides and ended with a Chinese retreat towards Nanjing. While this was a military defeat for the Chinese, it proved that China would not be defeated easily and showed China's determination to the world, which became an enormous morale booster for the Chinese people as it ended the Japanese taunt that Japan could conquer Shanghai in three days and China in three months.
Afterward, the Chinese began to adopt the strategy of "trading space for time" (Chinese: 以空間換取時間). The Chinese army would put up fights to delay Japanese advance to northern and eastern cities, to allow the home front, along with its professionals and key industries, to retreat west into Chongqing. As a result of Chinese troops' scorched earth strategies, where dams and levees were intentionally sabotaged to create massive flooding, the consecutive Japanese advancements and conquests began to stall in late-1938.

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Chinese soldiers in house-to-house fighting in Battle of Tai'erzhuang.

Second Period: October 25, 1938 (Fall of Wuhan) - April 1944 (before Operation Ichi-Go).
During this period, the Chinese main objective was to prolong the war. Therefore, the Chinese army adopted the concept of "magnetic warfare" to attract advancing Japanese troops to definite points where they were subjected to ambush, flanking attacks, and encirclements in major engagements. The most prominent example of this tactic is the successful defense of Changsha numerous times.
Also, CCP and other local guerrillas forces continued their resistance in occupied areas to pester the enemy and make their administration over the vast lands of China difficult. As a result the Japanese really only controlled the cities and railroads, while the countryside were almost always hotbeds of partisan activity.
By 1940, the war had reached a stalemate with both sides making minimal gains. The Chinese had successfully defended their land from oncoming Japanese on several occasions, while strong resistance in areas occupied by the Japanese made a victory seem impossible to the Japanese. This frustrated the Japanese and led them to employ the "Three Alls Policy" (kill all, loot all, burn all), Hanyu Pinyin: Sānguāng Zhèngcè, Japanese On: Sankō Seisaku). It was during this time period that the bulk of Japanese atrocities were committed.
Third Period: April 17, 1944 (Operation Ichi-Go)-August 15, 1945 (Japanese Surrender).
At this stage Japan conducted its final offensive in China. Although large areas were captured in this massive operation, the Japanese military resources were exhausted and its army stretched to the limit. This allowed the Chinese to begin general full frontal counter-attacks to take back cities lost during Operation Ichi-Go, but these operations ended abruptly after the Japanese surrendered.

Foreign involvement

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German military personnel in China, 1936

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I-16 with Chinese insignia. I-16 was the main fighter plane used by the Chinese Air Force and Soviet volunteers.

The Second Sino-Japanese War was not just a war between Japan and China, but involved many nations that had different vested interests that influenced their position and action taken during different phases of this war. It is clear that China had an intensely difficult task at hand in attempting to win Allies' support while they had motives not necessarily in congruence with China's.
At the outbreak of full scale war, many global powers were reluctant to provide support to China; because in their opinion the Chinese would eventually lose the war, and they did not wish to antagonize the Japanese who might, in turn, eye their colonial possessions in the region. They expected any support given to Kuomintang might worsen their own relationship with the Japanese, who taunted the Kuomintang with the prospect of conquest within three months.
However, Germany and the Soviet Union did provide support to the Chinese before the war escalated to the Asian theater of World War II. Prior to the outbreak of the war, Germany and China had close economic and military cooperation, with Germany helping China modernize its industry and military in exchange for raw materials. More than half of the German arms exports during its rearmament period were to China. Nevertheless the proposed 30 new divisions equipped and trained with Germany assistance did not materialize when Germany withdrew its support in 1938. The Soviet Union wished to keep China in the war to hinder the Japanese from invading Siberia, thus saving itself from a two front war. In September 1937 the Soviet leadership signed Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, began aiding China and approved Operation Zet, a Soviet volunteer air force. As part of the secret operation Soviet technicians upgraded and handled some of the Chinese war-supply transport. Bombers, fighters, military supplies and advisers arrived, including future Soviet war hero Georgy Zhukov, who won the Battle of Halhin Gol. Prior to the entrance of Western allies, the Soviet Union provided the largest amount of foreign aid to China, totaling some $250 million of credits in munitions and supplies. In 1941 Soviet aid ended as a result of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and the beginning of Great Patriotic War. This pact avoided the Soviet Union from fighting against Germany and Japan at the same time.
From December 1937, events such as the Japanese attack on the USS //Panay// and the Nanking Massacre, swung public opinion in the West sharply against Japan and increased their fear of Japanese expansionism, which prompted United States, the United Kingdom, and France to provide loan assistance for war supply contracts to Kuomintang. Furthermore, Australia prevented a Japanese Government-owned company from taking over an iron mine in Australia, and banned iron ore exports in 1938. Japan retaliated by invading Vietnam in 1940, and successfully blockaded China and prevented import of arms, fuel and 10,000 metric tons/month of materials supplied by the Western Powers through the Haiphong-Yunnan Fou railway line.
By mid-1941, the United States organized the American Volunteer Group, or Flying Tigers. Their early combat success of 300 kills against a loss of 12 of their shark painted P-40 fighters earned them wide recognition at the time when Allies were suffering heavy losses. Entering soon after the U.S. and Japan were at war, their dog fighting tactics would be adopted by U.S. forces. They would also transmit the appreciative Chinese thumbs-up gesture for number one into military culture. In addition, the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies began oil and/or steel embargos. The loss of oil imports made it impossible for Japan to continue operations in China. This set the stage for Japan to launch a series of military attack against the western Allies, when the Imperial Navy raided Pearl Harbor on December 8, 1941 (December 7 in U.S. time zones).

Entrance of Western Allies

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Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill met at the Cairo Conference in 1943 during World War II.

Within a few days of the attack on Pearl Harbor, both the United States and China officially declared war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek continued to receive supplies from the United States, as the Chinese conflict was merged into the Asian theater of World War II. However, in contrast to the Arctic supply route to the Soviet Union that stayed open most of the war, sea routes to China had long been closed, so between the closing of the Burma Road in 1942 and its re-opening as the Ledo Road in 1945, foreign aid was largely limited to what could be flown in over The Hump. Most of China's own industry had already been captured or destroyed by Japan, and the Soviet Union could spare little from the Eastern Front. Because of these reasons, the Chinese government never had the supplies and equipment needed to mount a major offensive.
Chiang was appointed Allied Commander-in-Chief in the China theater in 1942. General Joseph Stilwell served for a time as Chiang's Chief of Staff, while commanding U.S. forces in the China Burma India Theater. However, relations between Stilwell and Chiang soon broke down, because of a number of factors. Some historians suggested it is largely due to the corruption and inefficiency of the Chinese government. However, some historians believed it was a more complicated situation. Stilwell had a strong desire to assume control of Chinese troops, which Chiang vehemently opposed. Stilwell did not appreciate the complexity of the situation, including the buildup of the Chinese Communists during the war (essentially Chiang had to fight a multi-front war—the Japanese on one side, the Communists on the other) Stilwell criticized the Chinese government's conduct of the war in the American media, and to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Chiang was hesitant to deploy more Chinese troops away from the main front because China already suffered tens of millions of war casualties, and believed that Japan would eventually capitulate to America's overwhelming industrial output and manpower. The Allies began to lose confidence in the Chinese ability to conduct offensive operations from the Asian mainland, and instead concentrated their efforts against the Japanese in the Pacific Ocean Areas and South West Pacific Area, employing an island hopping strategy.

external image 250px-Chiang_Kai_Shek_and_wife_with_Lieutenant_General_Stilwell.jpgexternal image magnify-clip.png
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his wife Madame Chiang with Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell in 1942.

Conflicts among China, the United States, and the United Kingdom also emerged in the Pacific war. Winston Churchill was reluctant to devote British troops, the majority of whom were defeated by the Japanese in earlier campaigns, to reopen the Burma Road. On the other hand, Stilwell believed that the reopening of the Burma Road was vital to China as all the ports on mainland China were under Japanese control. Churchill's "Europe First" policy obviously did not sit well with Chiang. Furthermore, the later British insistence that China send in more and more troops into Indochina in the Burma Campaign was regarded as an attempt by Great Britain to use Chinese manpower to secure Britain's colonial holdings in Southeast Asia and prevent the gate to India from falling to Japan. Chiang also believed that China should divert its troops to eastern China to defend the airbases of the American bombers, a strategy that U.S. General Claire Chennault supported. In addition, Chiang voiced his support of Indian independence in a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi in 1942, which further soured the relationship between China and the United Kingdom.
The United States saw the Chinese theater as a means to tie up a large number of Japanese troops, as well as being a location for American airbases from which to strike the Japanese home islands. In 1944, as the Japanese position in the Pacific was deteriorating fast, the Imperial Japanese Army launched Operation Ichigo to attack the airbases which had begun to operate. This brought the Hunan, Henan, and Guangxi provinces under Japanese administration. The failure of the Chinese forces to defend these areas led to the replacement of Stilwell by Major General Albert Wedemeyer. However, Chinese troops under the command of Sun Li-jen drove out the Japanese in North Burma to secure the Ledo Road, a supply route to China. In Spring 1945, the Chinese launched offensives and retook Guangxi and other southwestern regions. With the Chinese army well in the progress training and equipping, Albert Wedemeyer planned to launch Operation Carbonado in summer 1945 to retake Guangdong, obtaining a coastal port, and from there drive northwards toward Shanghai. However, the dropping of the atomic bombs hastened Japanese surrender and these plans were not put into action.

Conclusion and aftermath

As of mid 1945, all sides expected the war to continue for at least another year. On August 6, an American B-29 bomber dropped the first atomic bomb used in combat on Hiroshima. On August 9, the Soviet Union renounced its non-aggression pact with Japan and attacked the Japanese in Manchuria, fulfilling its Yalta Conference pledge to attack the Japanese within three months after the end of the war in Europe. The attack was made by three Soviet army groups. In less than two weeks the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, consisting of over a million men but lacking in adequate armor, artillery, or air support, and depleted of many of its best soldiers by the demands of the Allies' Pacific drive, had been destroyed by the Soviets. Later in the day on August 9, a second atomic bomb was dropped by the United States on Nagasaki. Emperor Hirohito officially capitulated to the Allies on August 15, 1945, and the official surrender was signed aboard the battleship USS //Missouri// on September 2. The Japanese troops in China formally surrendered on September 9, 1945, and by the provisions of the Cairo Conference of 1943, the lands of Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores Islands reverted to China. However, the Ryukyu Islands were maintained as Japanese territory.
external image 250px-Liuchow_1945.jpgexternal image magnify-clip.png
The Chinese return to Liuchow (Liuzhou) in July 1945.

In 1945, China emerged from the war nominally a great military power but was actually a nation economically prostrated and on the verge of all-out civil war. The economy deteriorated, sapped by the military demands of a long, costly war and internal strife, by spiraling inflation, and by Nationalist profiteering, speculation, and hoarding. Starvation came in the wake of the war, as large swathes of the prime farming areas had been ravaged by the fighting. Millions were rendered homeless by floods and the destruction of towns and cities in many parts of the country. The problems of rehabilitating the formerly Japanese-occupied areas and of reconstructing the nation from the ravages of a protracted war were staggering.
The situation was further complicated by an Allied agreement at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that brought Soviet troops into Manchuria to hasten the termination of war against Japan. Although the Chinese had not been present at Yalta, they had been consulted; they had agreed to have the Soviets enter the war in the belief that the Soviet Union would deal only with the Nationalist government. After the war, the Soviet Union, as part of the Yalta agreement's allowing a Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria, dismantled and removed more than half the industrial equipment left there by the Japanese. The Soviet presence in northeast China enabled the Communists to move in long enough to arm themselves with the equipment surrendered by the withdrawing Japanese army.

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Japanese Instrument of Surrender.

The war left the Nationalists severely weakened and their policies left them unpopular. Meanwhile the war strengthened the Communists, both in popularity and as a viable fighting force. At Yan'an and elsewhere in the "liberated areas," Mao Zedong was able to adapt Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions. He taught party cadres to lead the masses by living and working with them, eating their food, and thinking their thoughts. When this failed, however, more repressive forms of coercion, indoctrination and ostracization were also employed. The Red Army fostered an image of conducting guerrilla warfare in defense of the people. In addition, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was effectively split into "Red" (cadres working in the "liberated" areas) and "White" (cadres working underground in enemy-occupied territory) spheres, a split that would later sow future factionalism within the CCP. Communist troops adapted to changing wartime conditions and became a seasoned fighting force. Mao also began preparing for the establishment of a new China, well away from the front at his base in Yan'an. In 1940 he outlined the program of the Chinese Communists for an eventual seizure of power and began his final push for consolidation of CCP power under his authority. His teachings became the central tenets of the CCP doctrine that came to be formalized as "Mao Zedong Thought." With skillful organizational and propaganda work, the Communists increased party membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945. Soon, all out war broke out between the KMT and CCP, a war that would leave the Nationalists banished to Taiwan and the Communists victorious on the mainland.

Legacy: Who fought the War of Resistance?

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China War of Resistance Against Japan Memorial Museum on the site where Marco Polo Bridge Incident took place.

The question as to which political group directed the Chinese war effort and exerted most of the effort to resist the Japanese remains a controversial issue.
In the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan Memorial near the Marco Polo Bridge and in mainland Chinese textbooks, the People's Republic of China (PRC) claims that it was the Communist Party that directed Chinese efforts in the war and did everything to resist the Japanese invasion. Recently, however, with a change in the political climate, the CCP has admitted that certain Nationalist generals made important contributions in resisting the Japanese. The official history in mainland China is that the KMT fought a bloody, yet indecisive, frontal war against Japan, while it was the CCP that engaged the Japanese forces in far greater numbers behind enemy lines. This emphasis on the CCP's central role is partially reflected by the PRC's labeling of the war as the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War of Resistance rather than merely the War of Resistance. According to the PRC official point of view, the Nationalists mostly avoided fighting the Japanese in order to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Communists. However, for the sake of Chinese reunification and appeasing the ROC on Taiwan, the PRC has now "acknowledged" that the Nationalists and the Communists were "equal" contributors because the victory over Japan belonged to the Chinese people, rather than to any political party.
Leaving aside Nationalists sources, scholars researching third party Japanese and Soviet sources have documented quite a different view. Such studies claim that the Communists actually played a minuscule involvement in the war against the Japanese compared to the Nationalists and used guerrilla warfare as well as opium sales to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Kuomintang.[4] This is congruent with the Nationalist viewpoint, as demonstrated by history textbooks published in Taiwan, which gives the KMT credit for the brunt of the fighting. According to these third-party scholars, the Communists were not the main participants in any of the 22 major battles, most involving more than 100,000 troops on both sides, between China and Japan. Soviet liaison to the Chinese Communists Peter Vladimirov documented that he never once found the Chinese Communists and Japanese engaged in battle during the period from 1942 to 1945. He also expressed frustration at not being allowed by the Chinese Communists to visit the frontline,[5] although as a foreign diplomat Vladimirov may have been overly optimistic to expect to be allowed to join Chinese guerrilla sorties. The Communists usually avoided open warfare (the Hundred Regiments Campaign and the Battle of Pingxingguan are notable exceptions), preferring to fight in small squads to harass the Japanese supply lines. In comparison, right from the beginning of the war the Nationalists committed their best troops (including the 36th, 87th, 88th divisions, the crack divisions of Chiang's Central Army) to defend Shanghai from the Japanese. The Japanese considered the Kuomintang rather than the Communists as their main enemy[6] and bombed the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing to the point that it was the most heavily bombed city in the world to date.[7] The KMT army suffered some 3.2 million casualties while the CCP increased its military strength from minimally significant numbers to 1.7 million men. This change in strength was a direct result of Japanese forces fighting mainly in Central and Southern China, away from major Communist strongholds such as those in Shaanxi.
While the PRC government has been accused of greatly exaggerating the CCP's role in fighting the Japanese, the legacy of the war is more complicated in the Republic of China on Taiwan. Traditionally, the government has held celebrations marking the Victory Day on September 9 (now known as Armed Forces Day), and Taiwan's Retrocession Day on October 25. However, with the power transfer from KMT to the more pro-Taiwan independence pan-green coalition and the rise of desensitization, events commemorating the war have become less commonplace. Many supporters of Taiwan independence see no relevance in preserving the memory of the war of resistance that happened primarily on mainland China (and even sympathize with Japanese actions). Still, commemorations are held in regions where politics is dominated by the pan-blue coalition. Many pan-blue supporters, particularly veterans who retreated with the government in 1949, still have an emotional interest in the war. For example, in celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the end of war in 2005, the cultural bureau of pan-blue stronghold Taipei held a series of talks in the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall regarding the war and post-war developments, while the KMT held its own exhibit in the KMT headquarters.
To this day the war is a major point of contention between China and Japan. The war remains a major roadblock for Sino-Japanese relations, and many people, particularly in China, harbor grudges over the war and related issues. A small but vocal group of Japanese nationalists and/or right-wingers deny a variety of crimes attributed to Japan. The Japanese invasion of its neighbors is often glorified or whitewashed, and wartime atrocities, most notably the Nanjing Massacre, comfort women, and Unit 731, are frequently denied by such individuals. The Japanese government has also been accused of historical revisionism by allowing the approval of school textbooks omitting or glossing over Japan's militant past. In response to criticism of Japanese textbook revisionism, the PRC government has been accused of using the war to stir up already growing anti-Japanese feelings in order to whip up nationalistic sentiments and divert its citizens' minds from internal matters.

Casualties assessment

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A baby in Shanghai's South Station after a Japanese bombing

The conflict lasted for 8 years, 1 month, and 3 days (measured from 1937 to 1945).

Chinese casualties

  • The Kuomintang fought in 22 major engagements, most of which involved more than 100,000 troops on both sides, 1,171 minor engagements most of which involved more than 50,000 troops on both sides, and 38,931 skirmishes.
  • The Chinese casualties were 3.22 million soldiers. 9.13 million civilians who died in the crossfire, and another 8.4 million as non-military casualties. According to historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta, at least 2.7 million civilians died during the "kill all, loot all, burn all" operation (Three Alls Policy, or sanko sakusen) implemented in May 1942 in North China by general Yasuji Okamura and authorized on December 3, 1941 by Imperial Headquarter Order number 575.[8]
Chinese sources list the total military and non-military casualties, dead and wounded, of the Chinese were 35 million.[9] Most Western historians believed that the casualties were at least 20 million.[10] Property loss of the Chinese valued up to 383 billion US dollars according to the currency exchange rate in July 1937, roughly 50 times the GDP of Japan at that time (US$7.7 billion).
  • In addition, the war created 95 million refugees.

Japanese casualties

The Japanese recorded around 1.1 to 1.9 million military casualties, killed, wounded and missing, although this number is disputed. The official death-toll according to the Japan defense ministry was only about 200,000, but this is believed to be extremely low when considering the length of the conflict. The combined Chinese forces claimed to have killed at most 1.77 million Japanese soldiers during the eight-year war.

Number of troops involved

National Revolutionary Army

File:Republic of China Army Flag.svg
The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) throughout its lifespan employed approximately 4,300,000 regulars, in 370 Standard Divisions, 46 New Divisions, 12 Cavalry Divisions, 8 New Cavalry Divisions, 66 Temporary Divisions, and 13 Reserve Divisions, for a grand total of 515 divisions. However, many divisions were formed from two or more other divisions, and many were not active at the same time. The number of active divisions, at the start of the war in 1937, was about 170 NRA divisions. The average NRA division had 4,000–5,000 troops. A Chinese army was roughly the equivalent to a Japanese division in terms of manpower but the Chinese forces largely lacked artillery, heavy weapons, and motorized transport. The shortage of military hardware meant that three to four Chinese armies had the firepower of only one Japanese division. Because of these material constraints, available artillery and heavy weapons were usually assigned to specialist brigades rather than to the general division, which caused more problems as the Chinese command structure lacked precise coordination. The relative fighting strength of a Chinese division was even weaker when relative capacity in aspects of warfare, such as intelligence, logistics, communications, and medical services, are taken into account.
The National Revolutionary Army can be divided roughly into two groups. The first one is the so-called dixi (嫡系, "direct descent") group, which comprised divisions trained by the Whampoa Military Academy and loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, and can be considered the Central Army of the NRA. The second group is known as the zapai, "miscellaneous units"), and comprised all divisions led by non-Whampoa commanders, and is more often known as the Regional Army or the Provincial Army. Even though both military groups were part of the National Revolutionary Army, their distinction lies much in their allegiance to the central government of Chiang Kai-shek. Many former warlords and regional militarists were incorporated into the NRA under the flag of the Kuomintang, but in reality they retained much independence from the central government. They also controlled much of the military strength of China, the most notable of them being the Guangxi, Shanxi, Yunnan and Ma Cliques.
Although during the war the Chinese Communist forces fought as a nominal part of the NRA, the number of those on the CCP side, due to their guerrilla status, is difficult to determine, though estimates place the total number of the Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army, and irregulars in the Communist armies at 1,300,000.
For more information of combat effectiveness of communist armies and other units of Chinese forces see Chinese armies in the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Imperial Japanese Army

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Flag of the Imperial Japanese Army.

  • The IJA had approximately 3,200,000 regulars. More Japanese troops were quartered in China than deployed elsewhere in the Pacific Theater during the war. Japanese divisions ranged from 20,000 men in its divisions numbered less than 100, to 10,000 men in divisions numbered greater than 100. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the IJA had 51 divisions of which 35 were in China, and 39 independent brigades of which all but one were in China. This represented roughly 80% of the IJA's manpower.
  • The Collaborationist Chinese Army in 1938 had 78,000 people, and grew to 145,000 in 1940. Their growth was explosive around 1942-43 reaching 649,640 in a March 17 1943 British Intelligence report.[11]According to KMT estimates 1,186,000 people were involved in the collaborationist army by the war's end. At their height they fielded a maximum of 900,000 troops. Almost all of them belonged to the regional puppet governments such as Manchukuo, Provisional Government of the Republic of China (Beijing), Reformed Government of the Republic of China (Nanjing) and the later collaborationist Nanjing Nationalist Government or Wang Jingwei regime. The puppet and collaborationist troops were mainly assigned to garrison and logistics duties in areas held by the puppet governments and in occupied territories. They were rarely fielded in combat because of low morale and distrust by the Japanese, and fared poorly in skirmishes against real Chinese forces, whether the KMT or the CCP.

Chinese and Japanese equipment

The National Revolutionary Army

The Central Army possessed 80 Army infantry divisions with approximately 8,000 men each, nine independent brigades, nine cavalry divisions, two artillery brigades, 16 artillery regiments and three armored battalions. The Chinese Navy displaced only 59,000 metric tons and the Chinese Air Force comprised only about 700 obsolete aircraft.
Chinese weapons were mainly produced in the Hanyang and Guangdong arsenals. However, for most of the German-trained divisions, the standard firearms were German-made 7.92 mm Gewehr 98 and Karabiner 98k. A local variant of the 98k style rifles were often called the "Chiang Kai-shek rifle" a Chinese copy from the Mauser Standard Model. Another rifle they used was Hanyang 88. The standard light machine gun was a local copy of the Czech 7.92 mm Brno ZB26. There were also Belgian and French LMGs. Surprisingly, the NRA did not purchase any of the famous Maschinengewehr 34s from Germany, but did produce their own copies of them. On average in these divisions, there was one machine gun set for each platoon. Heavy machine guns were mainly locally-made 1924 water-cooled Maxim guns, from German blueprints. On average every battalion would get one HMG. The standard sidearm was the 7.63 mm Mauser M1932 semi-automatic pistol.
Some divisions were equipped with 37 mm PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns, and/or mortars from Oerlikon, Madsen, and Solothurn. Each infantry division had 6 French Brandt 81 mm mortars and 6 Solothurn 20 mm autocannons. Some independent brigades and artillery regiments were equipped with Bofors 72 mm L/14, or Krupp 72 mm L/29 mountain guns. They were 24 Rheinmetall 150 mm L/32 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1934) and 24 Krupp 150 mm L/30 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1936).
Infantry uniforms were basically redesigned Zhongshan suits. Leg wrappings are standard for soldiers and officers alike since the primary mode of movement for NRA troops was by foot. The helmets were the most distinguishing characteristic of these divisions. From the moment German M35 helmets (standard issue for the Wehrmacht until late in the European theatre) rolled off the production lines in 1935, and until 1936, the NRA imported 315,000 of these helmets, each with the 12-ray sun emblem of the ROC on the sides. Other equipment included cloth shoes for soldiers, leather shoes for officers and leather boots for high-ranking officers. Every soldier was issued ammunition, ammunition pouch/harness, a water flask, combat knives, food bag, and a gas mask.
On the other hand, warlord forces varied greatly in terms of equipment and training. Some warlord troops were notoriously under-equipped, such as Shanxi's Dadao Teams and the Yunnanese army. Some however were highly professional forces with their own air force and navies. The quality of Guangxi's army was almost on par with the Central Army's, as the Guangzhou region was wealthy and the local army could afford foreign instructors and arms. The Muslim Ma clique to the Northwest was famed for its well-trained cavalry divisions.

The Imperial Japanese Army

Although Imperial Japan possessed significant mobile operational capacity, it did not possess capability for maintaining a long sustained war. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War the Japanese Army comprised 17 divisions, each composed of approximately 22,000 men, 5,800 horses, 9,500 rifles and submachine guns, 600 heavy machine guns of assorted types, 108 artillery pieces, and 24 tanks. Special forces were also available. The Japanese Navy displaced a total of 1,900,000 metric tons, ranking third in the world, and possessed 2,700 aircraft at the time. Each Japanese division was the equivalent in fighting strength of four Chinese regular divisions (at the beginning of Battle of Shanghai (1937)).

Major figures

China: Nationalist

  • Bai Chongxi
  • Chen Cheng
  • Chiang Kai-Shek
  • Du Yuming
  • Fang Xianjue
  • Feng Yuxiang
  • Gu Zhutong
  • He Yingqin
  • H. H. Kung
  • Hu Kexian
  • Hu Zongnan
  • Li Zongren
  • Long Yun
  • Ma Zhanshan
  • Song Zheyuan
  • Soong May-ling
  • T. V. Soong
  • Sun Lianzhong
  • Sun Liren
  • Tang Enbai
  • Tang Shengzhi
  • Wang Jingwei
  • Wei Lihuang
  • Xue Yue
  • Yan Xishan
  • Xie Jinyuan
  • Ye Ting
  • Zhang Fakui
  • Zhang Zhizhong
  • Zhang Zizhong
  • Zhu Shaoliang

China: Communist

Japan: Imperial Japanese Army

  • Emperor Shōwa
  • Abe Nobuyuki
  • Anami Korechika
  • Prince Asaka Yasuhiko
  • Prince Chichibu Yasuhito
  • Doihara Kenji
  • Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu
  • Hashimoto Kingoro
  • Hata Shunroku
  • Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko
  • Honma Masaharu
  • Ishii Shiro
  • Isogai Rensuke
  • Itagaki Seishiro
  • Prince Kan'in Kotohito
  • Konoe Fumimaro (Kyūjitai)
  • Kanji Ishiwara
  • Koiso Kuniaki
  • Matsui Iwane
  • Mutaguchi Renya
  • Kesago Nakajima
  • Toshizo Nishio
  • Yasuji Okamura
  • Sakai Takashi
  • Sugiyama Hajime
  • Prince Takeda Tsuneyoshi
  • Terauchi Hisaichi
  • Tojo Hideki (Kyūjitai)
  • Umezu Yoshijiro
  • Yamaguchi Tamon
  • Yamashita Tomoyuki

Puppet governments

Manchukuo
Mengjiang
  • Demchugdongrub
East Hebei Autonomous Council
  • Yin Ju-keng
Provisional Government of the Republic of China
  • Wang Kemin
Nanjing Nationalist Government
  • Chen Gongbo
  • Wang Jingwei
  • Zhou Fohai

Foreign personnel on Chinese side

  • Alexander von Falkenhausen
    Flag of Germany 1933.svg
    Flag of Germany 1933.svg
  • Joseph Stilwell
    Flag of the United States.svg
    Flag of the United States.svg
  • Albert Coady Wedemeyer
    Flag of the United States.svg
    Flag of the United States.svg
  • Claire Chennault
    Flag of the United States.svg
    Flag of the United States.svg
  • Agnes Smedley
    Flag of the United States.svg
    Flag of the United States.svg
  • Edgar Snow
    Flag of the United States.svg
    Flag of the United States.svg
  • Norman Bethune
    Flag of Canada.svg
    Flag of Canada.svg
  • John Rabe
    Flag of Germany 1933.svg
    Flag of Germany 1933.svg
  • Jakob Rosenfeld
    Flag of Austria.svg
    Flag of Austria.svg
  • Morris Abraham "Two-Gun" Cohen
    Flag of the United Kingdom.svg
    Flag of the United Kingdom.svg
  • James Gareth Endicott
    Flag of Canada.svg
    Flag of Canada.svg
  • Dwarkanath Kotnis
    Flag of India.svg
    Flag of India.svg
  • George Hogg
    Flag of the United Kingdom.svg
    Flag of the United Kingdom.svg

Military engagements of the Second Sino-Japanese War

Battles

Battles with articles. Flag shows victorious side in each engagement. Date shows beginning date except for the 1942 battle of Changsha, which began in Dec. 1941.
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Mukden September 1931
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Invasion of Manchuria September 1931
    • Flag of Japan
      Flag of Japan
      Jiangqiao Campaign October 1931
    • Flag of Republic of China
      Flag of Republic of China
      Resistance at Nenjiang Bridge November 1931
    • Flag of Japan
      Flag of Japan
      Jinzhou December 1931
    • Flag of Japan
      Flag of Japan
      Defense of Harbin January 1932

  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Naval Ensign of Japan.svg
    Naval Ensign of Japan.svg
    Shanghai (1932) January 1932
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Pacification of Manchukuo March 1932
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Great Wall January 1933
    • Flag of Japan
      Flag of Japan
      Battle of Rehe February 1933

  • Actions in Inner Mongolia (1933-36)
    • Flag of Republic of China
      Flag of Republic of China
      Suiyuan Campaign October 1936

  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Battle of Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) July 1937
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Beiping-Tianjin July 1937
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Chahar August 1937
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Naval Ensign of Japan.svg
    Naval Ensign of Japan.svg
    Battle of Shanghai August 1937
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Beiping–Hankou August 1937
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Tianjin–Pukou August 1937
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Taiyuan September 1937
    • Flag of Republic of China
      Flag of Republic of China
      Battle of Pingxingguan September 1937
    • Flag of Japan
      Flag of Japan
      Battle of Xinkou September 1937

  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Battle of Nanjing December 1937
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Battle of Xuzhou December 1937
    • Flag of Republic of China
      Flag of Republic of China
      Battle of Taierzhuang March 1938

  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Northern and Eastern Honan 1938 January 1938
    • Flag of Republic of China
      Flag of Republic of China
      Battle of Lanfeng May 1938

  • Naval Ensign of Japan.svg
    Naval Ensign of Japan.svg
    Xiamen May 1938
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Battle of Wuhan June 1938
    • Flag of Republic of China
      Flag of Republic of China
      Battle of Wanjialing

  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Guangdong October 1938
  • Naval Ensign of Japan.svg
    Naval Ensign of Japan.svg
    Hainan Island February 1939
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Battle of Nanchang March 1939
    • Flag of Japan
      Flag of Japan
      Battle of Xiushui River March 1939

  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Battle of Suixian-Zaoyang May 1939
  • Naval Ensign of Japan.svg
    Naval Ensign of Japan.svg
    Shantou June 1939
  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Battle of Changsha (1939) September 1939
  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Battle of South Guangxi November 1939
    • Flag of Republic of China
      Flag of Republic of China
      Battle of Kunlun Pass December 1939

  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    1939-40 Winter Offensive November 1939
    • Flag of Republic of China
      Flag of Republic of China
      Battle of Wuyuan March 1940

  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Battle of Zaoyang-Yichang May 1940
  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Hundred Regiments Offensive August 1940
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Naval Ensign of Japan.svg
    Naval Ensign of Japan.svg
    Vietnam Expedition September 1940
  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Central Hupei November 1940
  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Battle of South Henan January 1941
  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Western Hopei March 1941
  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Battle of Shanggao March 1941
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Battle of South Shanxi May 1941
  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Battle of Changsha (1941) September 1941
  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Battle of Changsha (1942) January 1942
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Battle of Yunnan-Burma Road March 1942
    • Flag of Japan
      Flag of Japan
      Battle of Toungoo
    • Flag of Republic of China
      Flag of Republic of China
      Flag of United Kingdom
      Flag of United Kingdom
      Battle of Yenangyaung

  • Battle of Zhejiang-Jiangxi April 1942
  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Battle of West Hubei May 1943
  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Battle of Northern Burma and Western Yunnan October 1943
  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Battle of Changde November 1943
  • Flag of Japan
    Flag of Japan
    Operation Ichi-Go
    • Flag of Japan
      Flag of Japan
      Operation Kogo Battle of Central Henan April 1944
    • Flag of Japan
      Flag of Japan
      Operation Togo 1 Battle of Changsha (1944)
    • Flag of Japan
      Flag of Japan
      Operation Togo 2 and Operation Togo 3 Battle of Guilin-LiuzhouAugust 1944

  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Battle of West Hunan April - June 1945
  • Flag of Republic of China
    Flag of Republic of China
    Second Guangxi Campaign April - July 1945
  • Flag of Soviet Union
    Flag of Soviet Union
    Operation August Storm August – September 1945

Aerial engagements

  • Aerial Engagements of the Second Sino-Japanese War

Japanese invasions and operations

  • Japanese Campaigns in Chinese War
  • Chinchow Operation
  • Manchukuoan Anti Bandit Operations
  • Operation Nekka
  • Peiking-Hankou Railway Operation
  • Tientsin–Pukow Railway Operation
  • Operation Quhar
  • Kuolichi-Taierhchuang Operation
  • Canton Operation
  • Amoy Operation
  • Hainan Island Operation
  • Han River Operation
  • Invasion of French Indochina
  • Swatow Operation
  • Sczechwan Invasion
  • CHE-KIANG Operation
  • Kwanchow-Wan Occupation
  • Operation Ichi-Go

List of Japanese political and military incidents

Attacks on civilians

  • Nanking Massacre
  • Unit 731
  • Unit 100
  • Unit 516
  • Unit 1855
  • Unit 2646
  • Unit 8604
  • Unit 9420
  • Unit Ei 1644
  • Comfort women
  • Sanko sakusen
  • Shantung Incident
  • Taihoku Air Strike
  • Bombing of Chongqing
  • Kaimingye germ weapon attack
  • Changteh Chemical Weapon Attack
  • Battle of Zhejiang-Jiangxi
  • Sook Ching Massacre (specifically against Chinese nationals in Singapore)

See also

Notes

  1. Jowett, Phillip. 2004. Rays of the Rising Sun. Solihull, UK: Helion & Co. Ltd. ISBN 1874622213. pg 72.
  2. Herbert P. Bix, "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility," Journal of Japanese Studies 18 (2): 295–363.
  3. Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2001, ISBN 00609313020, 364.
  4. Ming Chu-cheng and Flora Chang, Rewriters of history ignore truth, Taipei Times. Retrieved May 26, 2008.
  5. Chu-cheng and Chang (2005), 8.
  6. Chang and Halliday (2005), 231.
  7. Chang and Halliday (2005), 232.
  8. MitsuyoshiHimeta, Sankô sakusen towa nan dataka-Chûgokujin no mita Nihon no sensô (Tokyo, JP: Iwanami Bukuretto, 1996), 43.
  9. Wu Chunqiu, Remember role in ending fascist war, China Daily. Retrieved May 26, 2008.
  10. Duncan Anderson, Nuclear Power: The End of the War Against Japan, BBC News. Retrieved May 26, 2008.
  11. Jowett (2004), 130-133.

References

  • Anderson, Duncan. Nuclear Power: The End of the War Against Japan. BBC News. Retrieved May 26, 2008.
  • Bix, Herbert P. 1992. "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility." Journal of Japanese Studies 18 (2):295–363.
  • Bix, Herbert P. 2001. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. New York, NY: Harper Collins. ISBN 0060931302.
  • Chang, Jung, and Jon Halliday. 2005. Mao: The Unknown Story. London, UK: Knopf. ISBN 0-679-42271-4.
  • Chu-cheng, Ming and Flora Chang. 2005. Rewriters of history ignore truth. Taipei Times. Retrieved May 26, 2008
  • Chunqiu, Wu. 2005. Remember role in ending fascist war. China Daily. Retrieved May 26, 2008.
  • Gordon, David M. 2006. "The China-Japan War, 1931–1945." Journal of Military History. 70 (1): 137-82. Retrieved May 18, 2008.
  • Himeta, Mitsuyoshi. 1996. Sankô sakusen towa nan dataka-Chûgokujin no mita Nihon no sensô. Tokyo, JP: Iwanami Bukuretto.
  • Jacoby, Annalee, and Theodore H. White. 1946. Thunder out of China. New York, NY: William Sloane Associates.
  • Jowett, Phillip. 2004. Rays of the Rising Sun. Solihull, UK: Helion & Co. Ltd. ISBN 1874622213.
  • Long-hsuen, Hsu, and Chang Ming-kai. 1972. History of the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). Taipei: Chung Wu Publishers.
  • Rugui, Guo. 2005. China's Anti-Japanese War Combat Operations (中国抗日战争正面战场作战记). Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Publishing House. ISBN 7214030349.
  • Wilson, Dick. 1982. When Tigers Fight: The Story of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945. New York, NY: Viking. ISBN 0-670-76003-X.

External links

All links retrieved August 26, 2015.

Credits

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Evidence associated with John Rabe

A SIMPLE PREZI PRESENTATION
https://prezi.com/s3iou0r7jr5l/nanking-massacre/

http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/UsefulNotes/SecondSinoJapaneseWar?from=Main.SecondSino-JapaneseWar


http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~ma23j/world%20politics/history%20of%20nanking%20M.html

SCROLL DOWN FOR DIFFERENT INFORMATION. MAKE SURE THAT YOU CITE THE ORIGINAL WEBSITES ATTACHED.

PRIMARY SOURCES
This information has come from:
http://web.library.yale.edu/divinity/nanking/documents


Part 1
Archives of the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia, Record Group No. 11
Document filename


RG 11: Box 229 Folder 3875: "College Files: University of Nanking: Correspondence: Wilson, Robert 1937"
NMP0012
Aug. 15 - Sept. 3, 1937 "Dear Folks"

Letter from Robert O. Wilson to multiple people
NMP0013
Aug. 16, 1937 "Dear Dr. Wilson"

Letter to Robert O. Wilson from B.A. Garside (?)
NMP0014
Sept. 24 - Dec. 14, 1937 "Dear Folks"

Letter from Robert O. Wilson to multiple people
NMP0015
Nov. 8, 1937 "Dear Dr. Wilson"

Letter to Dr. Wilson from W. Reginald Wheeler (University of Nanking faculty / mission executive)
NMP0016
Dec. 15, 1937 - Jan. 9, 1938 "Dear Family"

Letter from Dr. Wilson to his family



RG 11: Box 229 Folder 3876: "College Files: University of Nanking: Correspondence: Wilson, Robert 1938-1941"
NMP0017
Jan. 28 - 31, 1938 "Dearest Family"

Letter from Dr. Wilson to his family



RG 11: Box 229 Folder 3873: "College Files: University of Nanking: Correspondence: Mrs. Robert Wilson 1936-1938"
NMP0001
Dec. 28, 1937 "Dear Mr. Garside"

Card from Marjorie Wilson (Mrs. Robert O. Wilson) to B.A Garside (administrator, Associated Boards for Christian Colleges in China)
NMP0002
Jan. 21, 1938 "Dear Marjorie"
NMP0003
Jan. 25, 1938 "Dear Marjorie"
NMP0004
Feb. 17, 1938 "Dear Marjorie"
NMP0005
August 11, 1938 "Dear Marjorie"

All four above (Jan 21-Aug 11, 1938): Letters from B.A. Garside to Marjorie Wilson
NMP0006
July 26, 1938 "Dear Mr. Garside"
NMP0007
August 27, 1938 "Dear Mr. Garside"
NMP0008
Sept. 23, 1938 "Dear Mr. Garside"
NMP0009
Sept. 26, 1938 "Dear Mr. Garside"

All four above (July 26 - Sept 26) Letters from Marjorie Wilson to B. A. Garside.
NMP0010
Sept. 26, 1938 "Dear Marjorie"

Letter from B.A. Garside to Marjorie Wilson
NMP0011
Oct. 3, 1938 "Mrs. Wilson"

Letter from C.A. Evans to Marjorie Wilson regarding issuing her passport




Part 2
Albert and Celia Steward Papers, Record Group No. 20



RG 20: Box 10 Folder 220: "Nanking - conditions during Sino-Japanese war"
NMP0018
"The Classmate - Notes from a Nanking Diary"

Newsletter article (The Classmate: A Paper for Young People, Cincinnati, Ohio, April 30, 1938) on Minnie Vautrin"s journal



RG 20: Box 10 Folder 229: "Nanking, University of -newsletters 1937-1946"
NMP0019
November 10, 1937 "News Flashes from Nanking"

Newsletter (News Flashes from Nanking) compiled by W. Reginald Wheeler
NMP0020
December 24, 1937 "The University of Nanking"

Newsletter (News Flashes from Nanking) compiled by W. Reginald Wheeler


Part 3
Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No. 10



RG 10: Box 1 Folder 5: "Bates/wife and sons 1937 Jan-Aug"
NMP0021
Jan. 11, 1937 "Dearest"

Letter from Miner Searle Bates (Bates) to his wife Lilliath (LB), from Shanghai
NMP0022
March 23, 1937 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Tokyo



RG 10: Box 1 Folder 6: "Bates/wife and sons 1937 Sep-Oct"
NMP0023
Sept. 13, 1937 "Dear Mummy"

Letter to Lilliath Bates from Morton Bates (son)
NMP0024
Sept. 13, 1937 "Dearest"
NMP0025
Sept. 23, 1937 "Dearest"
NMP0026
Oct. 2-4, 1937

All above (Sept 13 - Oct 4): Letters to LB from Bates
NMP0027
Oct. 28, 1937 "Dear Daddy"

Letter to Bates from Morton Bates



RG 10: Box 1 Folder 7: "Bates/wife and sons 1937 Nov-Dec"
NMP0028
Nov. 14, 1937 "Dear Lilliath"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0029
Nov. 19, 1937 "Dear Searle"

Letter from Minnie Vautrin to Bates, Nanking
NMP0030
Nov. 8, 1937 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0031
Nov. 5, 1937 "Dearest Lilliath"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0032
Nov. 17, 1937 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0033
Nov. 28, 1937 "Dear Lilliath"

Postcard from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0034
December 24, 1937 "Dearest Lilliath"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking



RG 10: Box 1 Folder 8" "Bates/wife and sons 1938 Jan-Feb"
NMP0035
Jan. 1, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0036
Jan. 3, 1938 "Dear Lilliath"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0037
Jan. 9, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0038
Jan. 16, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0039
Jan. 21, 1938 "My dear Wife:"

Letter from Bates to LB from Nanking.
NMP0040
Jan. 29, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0041
Jan. 30, 1938 "Dear Morton and Bobby"

Letter from Bates to his sons, from Nanking
NMP0042
Feb. 1, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0043
Feb. 3, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0044
Feb. 11, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0045
Feb. 13, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0046
Feb. 17, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0047
Feb. 23, 1938 "Dearest"


Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0048
Mar. (?) 1938

Letter from Bates to LB; Unknown date (page 1 is missing)
NMP0049
March 5, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB
NMP0050
March 12, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB
NMP0051
March 15, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB
NMP0052
March 21, 1938 (?) "Dear Lilliath"

Postcard from Bates to LB
NMP0053
March 21 "Notes on items from your letters, March 7-10"

Letter from Bates to LB
NMP0054
March 22, 1938 "Dear Lilliath"

Letter from Bates to LB
NMP0055
March 30, 1938 "Dear Lilliath"

Postcard from Bates to LB
NMP0056
April 2, 1938 "Dear L"

Letter from Bates to LB
NMP0057
April 20, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB
NMP0058
April 27, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB
NMP0059
April 28, 1938 "Dear Bobby"

Letter from Bates to his son, Bobby
NMP0060
April 30, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB



RG 10: Box 1 Folder 10: "Bates to/from wife and sons 1938 May"
NMP0061
May 11, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking
NMP0062
May 16, 1938 "Dearest"

Letter from Bates to LB, from Nanking



RG 10: Box 4 Folder 59: "Japanese Embassy, Nanking 1937-1939, Japanese Embassy, Shanghai 1938"
NMP0063
Dec. 17, 1937 "Gentlemen"

Letter to Japanese Embassy from W. Plumer Mills
NMP0064
Dec. 17, 1937 "Gentlemen"

Letter from Chairman, Emergency Committee, University of Nanking
NMP0065
Dec. 16, 1937 "Gentlemen"

Letter from Chairman, Emergency Committee, University of Nanking
NMP0066
Dec. 18, 1937 "Gentlemen"

Letter from Chairman, Emergency Committee, University of Nanking
NMP0067
Dec. 19, 1937 &quoquot;Dear Sirs"

Letter from Robert O. Wilson
NMP0068
Dec. 21, 1937 "Dear Mr. Fukuda"
NMP0069
Dec. 22, 1937 "Gentlemen"
NMP0070
Dec. 25, 1937 "Dear Mr. Tanaka"
NMP0071
Dec. 27, 1937 "Gentlemen"
NMP0072
Dec. 30, 1937 "Gentlemen"

Letter from Charles H. Riggs and Miner Searle Bates
NMP0073
Dec. 30, 1937 "Gentlemen"

Letter from Bates
NMP0074
Dec. 31, 1937 "Gentlemen"
NMP0075
Jan. 8 - 18, 1938 "Gentlemen" and "Dear Mr. Allison"

Letter from Bates
NMP0076
Jan. 10, 1938 "Gentlemen"
NMP0077
Jan. 11, 1938 "Gentlemen"

Letter from Bates
NMP0078
Jan. 11, 1938 "Notes with a Copy..."

Letter to Rees-Baynton
NMP0079
Apr. 25, 1938 "Gentlemen"
NMP0080
Apr. 26, 1938 "Gentlemen"

Letter from Bates
NMP0081
May 11, 1938 "Dear Mr. Hanawa"

Letter from M.S. Bates
NMP0082
Sep. 10, 1938 "Dear Sir"
NMP0083
May 23, 1938 "Dear Mr. Horii"

Letter from M.S. Bates





RG 10: Box 4 Folder 60: "L"
NMP0084
Feb. 8, 1932 "Notes from Nanking" - Japan-China tensions -Manchuria

Written by Bates



RG 10: Box 4 Folder 62: "M"
NMP0085
April 2, 1938 "Dear Mr. McKim

Letter from M.S. Bates to Rev. J.C. McKim, c/o Dr. John Wood, 281 Fourth Ave, New York City, regarding New York Times stories on Nanjing atrocities



RG 10: Box 4 Folder 63: "Nanking International Relief Committee 1941; Nanking, University of; Board of Founders 1937-1938"; National Christian Council, Shanghai 1938"
NMP0086
March 3, 1938 "National Christian Council, Shanghai - Dear Friends"

Letter from Bates to National Christian Council - return of missionaries to Nanjing
NMP0087
March 28, 1938 "KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS" (2 pages)

Legal document by Chairman of Board of University of Nanking, John W Decker, giving Bates power of attorney for U. of Nanking
NMP0088
April 2, 1938 "Dear Dr. Bates"

Letter from C.A. Evans to Bates informing of decision by board to give him power of attorney
NMP0089
December 20, 1937 "To Members of the Board of Founders and Relatives of Staff"

Letter w/ telegram from US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull to board of U. of Nanking, letter prepared by B.A. Garside, sent to friends and relatives of staff of U. of Nanking informing of safety of staff.
NMP0090
May 1, 1941 "Dear Dr. Bates"

Letter from Forster, Kearney and Mills to Bates congratulating him on service of Nanking International Relief Committee



RG 10: Box 4 Folder 64: "P-T"
NMP0091
March 8, 1938 "Dear Friends in God"s Country"

Letter from Lewis and Margaret Smythe in Nanjing to United Christian Missionary Society in Indianapolis, IN re. current situation in Nanjing



RG 10: Box 4 Folder 65: "Timperley, H. J. 1936-1938"
NMP0092
Jan. 29, 1938 "Dear Bates"

Letter from H.J. Timperley (British author/ reporter for the Manchester Guardian) to Bates regarding idea for book on Nanking and China atrocities by Japanese
NMP0093
Feb. 16, 1938 "Dear Dr. Hornbeck"

Letter to Dr. Hornbeck from Timperley regarding John Magee"s film, written from Shanghai American Club
NMP0094
Feb. 17, 1938 "Dear Bates"

Letter from H.J. Timperley to Bates about book project, mentions letter to Dr. Hornbeck
NMP0095
Feb. 4, 1938 "Dear Bates"

Letter from H.J. Timperley to Bates about editing and sources of book project
NMP0096
March 3, 1938 "Dear Timperley"

Letter from Bates to Timperley about book project
NMP0097
March 14, 1938 "Dear Timperley"

Letter from Bates to Timperley about book project
NMP0098
March 14, 1938 "Dear Bates"

Letter from Timperley to Bates about book project with book plan
NMP0099
March 21, 1938 "Dear Searle"

Letter from Timperley to Bates about book project
NMP0100
March 21, 1938 "Dear Timperley

Letter from Bates to Timperley about book project
NMP0101
March 25, 1938 "Dear Dr. Bates"

Letter from Timperley to Bates about book project
NMP0102
March 28, 1938 "Dear Bates"

Letter from Timperley to Bates about book project



RG 10: Box 90 Folder 718: C. Reports and memoranda from China 1935, 1936
NMP0103
November 1935 "Memorandum on Policy Toward Japan"

Report by Bates
NMP0104
1936 "Please Destroy This Sheet After Making..." - Report on Present Day Japan

Written by Bates with particular reference to policy toward China; based on a visit of Bates to Japan in early 1936
NMP0105
April 10, 1936 "Suggestions on Policy Toward Japan"

Written by Bates
NMP0106
October 1, 1936 "Notes on the Diplomatic Situation as of Oct. 1, 1936"

Written by Bates

NMP0107
Late 1936 "Explanatory Note to Accompany "Memorandum on Policy toward Japan""

Written by Bates



RG 10: Box 90 Folder 719: C. Reports and Memoranda From China, 1937-1938
NMP0108
Spring 1937 "Cautious summary report"

Summary on army propaganda in Japanese schools
NMP0109
Christmas Eve, 1937 "Notes by Bates during December 1937"
NMP0110
1937 "Friendly Caution - And a Little Information"

Report on Japan by Bates
NMP0111
1937 "Summary Report of a Visit to Japan"
NMP0112
January 1938 "Statement by Bates Regarding Losses due to Depredations of Japanese Soldiers, Nanking, Dec. 18, 1937 - Jan. 11, 1938"
NMP0113
January 10, 1938 "Nanking Outrages"

Letter from Bates to friends regarding massacre
NMP0114
January 1938 "Japanese Propaganda in the Mirror of Events"
NMP0115
March 1, 1938 "Conjectural Notes and Few Facts on Nanking Economics"
NMP0116
March 10, 1938 "Newspaper Articles translated by Bates"
NMP0117
March 26, 1938 "Materials Regarding Problem Of Claims for the University of Nanking"
NMP0118
March 31, 1938 "Pseudo-Economic Notes from Nanking"
NMP0119
July 1, 1938 "Nanking Notes (mostly economic)"
NMP0120
November 22, 1938 "An Open Letter: On the Narcotic Problem, written by Bates"
NMP0121
Winter 1938 "Preliminary Report on Christian Work in Nanking"
NMP0122
"Drugs" a report by Bates on the drug situation in Nanking



RG 10: Box 102 Folder 861: Nanking during Sino-Japanese conflict, 1937 Nov
NMP0123
November 12, 1936 (7?) "Nanking Notes"

Note on official Japanese government secrecy
NMP0124
November 21, 1937 "To His Honor the Mayor of Nanking"

Letter from Bates to the Mayor of Nanking
NMP0125
November 22, 1937 "An International Committee composed of nationals of Denmark, Germany..."

Memo on the creation of the International Safety Zone Committee
NMP0126
November 30, 1937 "The International Committee which has been arranging..."

Announcement of telegram from International Committee to Japanese authorities in Shanghai
NMP0127
"List of American Citizens reported to be residents in Nanking on November 23, 1937"



RG 10: Box 102 Folder 862: Nanking during Sino-Japanese conflict 1937 Dec. 2-15
NMP0128
December, 1937 "List of Documents Regarding Rice and Flour Assigned to the International Committee By the Mayor of Nanking, but held by the Japanese Military Authorities"
NMP0129
December 2, 1937 "Naval Radio"

Telegram from American Embassy in Shanghai to Nanking Safety Zone Committee
NMP0130
December 2, 1937 "Embassy of the United States of America"

Letter from George Atcheson, Jr, Second Secretary of US Embassy, to "All Americans in Nanking"
NMP0131
December 2, 1937 "Telegram Sent"

Telegram from John Rabe, Chair of Nanking Safety Zone, to Father Jacquinot, Chair of Shanghai Safety Zone
NMP0132
December 4, 1937 "Naval Radio"

Telegram from Father Jacquinot, Chair of Shanghai Safety Zone, to Nanking Safety Zone Committee
NMP0133
December 4, 1937 "Dear Mr. Donald"

Letter from Nanking Safety Zone Committee to Mr. W. H. Donald, Esq.
NMP0134
December 4, 1937 "Embassy of the United States of America"

Letter from US Embassy to US citizens regarding evacuation of Nanking
NMP0135
December 5, 1937 "Embassy of the United States of America"

Letter urging Americans to leave Nanking
NMP0136
December 5, 1937 "Naval radio"

Letter from American Embassy to Nanking Safety Zone
NMP0137
December 8, 1937 "Embassy of the United States of America"

Circular from US Embassy to remaining Americans in Nanking
NMP0138
December 9, 1937 "Embassy of the United States of America"

Circular to Americans in Nanking
NMP0139
December 10, 11:00 AM "At a meeting of Col..."

Report by Nanking Safety Zone on boundaries of Zone
NMP0140
December 13, 1937 "Position of the International Relief Committee (Nanking) in Regard to Rice and Flour Assigned to it by the Former Mayor of the City..."
NMP0141
December 13, 1937 "Western Nationals in Nanking at the Time of Japanese Entry"
NMP0142
December 14, 1937 "Mr. Alexander Paul"

Letter written by Miss Frances Culley, American nurse in Wuhu General

Hospital to Alexander Paul in the United States
NMP0143
December 9, 1937 "Dear Folks"

A collection of letters written by foreign nationals in Nanking
NMP0144
December 14, 1937 "International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone"

Letter from John Rabe, Chair of the Safety Zone, to the Japanese

Commander of Nanking
NMP0145
December 15, 1937 "Some Pictures from Nanking"

Notes from Bates on situation soon after Japanese entry into Nanking
NMP0146
December 15, 1937 "International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone"

Letter from John Rabe, Chair of Safety Zone, to Mr. Tokuyasu Fukuda, an

attaché to the Japanese Embassy
NMP0147
December 13 - 27, 1937 "From a letter of Dr. John W. Wood, Secretary of the Domestic & Foreign Missionary Society of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the USA to Mr. Irving in Boston"
NMP0148
Feb. 3, 1938 (?) "case -1-..."

A list of cases of abuse by Japanese soldiers in the Safety Zone



RG 10: Box 102 Folder 863: Nanking during Sino-Japanese conflict 1937 Dec. 16-20
NMP0149
December 16, 1937 "Cases of Disorder by Japanese Soldiers in the Safety Zone"
NMP0150
December 16, 1937 "Western Nationals in Nanking"
NMP0151
December 17, 1937 "Dear Dr. Fitch"

Letter from D.Y. Giang to Dr. George Fitch, Professor at University of

Nanking
NMP0152
December 18, 1937 "Officers of the Japanese Embassy"

Letter from Safety Zone Committee to Japanese Embassy regarding

incidents in Safety Zone
NMP0153
December 20, 1937 "American Consulate-General"

Telegram from American Consulate in Shanghai to Japanese Embassy in

Nanking
NMP0154
December 20, 1937 "American Consulate-General-Shanghai"

Telegram from American Consulate in Shanghai to Japanese Embassy in

Nanking, with signatures of Committee Members
NMP0155
December 15, 1937 "Memorandum of Interview with Chief of Special Service Corps"
NMP0156
December 16, 1937 "International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone"

Letter from Lewis Smythe, Secretary of Safety Zone, to Tokuyasu Fukuda,

attaché to the Japanese Embassy
NMP0157
December 17, 1937 "Nanking, China..."

Letter from W.P. Mills to the Officers of the Japanese Embassy
NMP0158
December 17, 1937 "International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone" (7 pages)

Letter from John Rabe, Chair of the Safety Zone, to the Imperial Japanese

Embassy
NMP0159
December 18, 1937 "International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone" (9 pages)

Letter from John Rabe, Chair of the Safety Zone, to the Imperial Japanese

Embassy
NMP0160
December 19, 1937 "International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone" (10 pages)

Collection of letters from members of the Safety Zone Committee to the

Imperial Japanese Embassy
NMP0161
December 20, 1937 "International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone"

Letter from John Rabe, Chair of the Safety Zone, to the Imperial Japanese

Embassy
NMP0162
December 25 - January 11 "University of Nanking"

A collection of letters from Bates to the Japanese Embassy
NMP0163
January 18 - January 27, 1938 "American Embassy"

Letters from Bates to American Embassy
NMP0164
December 16-17, 1937 "Notes with a Copy of Correspondence between the University of Nanking and the Japanese Embassy"



RG 10: Box 102 Folder 864 Nanking during Sino-Japanese conflict 1937 Dec. 21-31
NMP0165
"American Series Regarding Japanese Occupation of Nanking"

Documenting letters sent from Safety Zone Committee to Japanese

Embassy
NMP0166
"Notes"

Part of a note documenting incidents of abuse by Japanese soldiers
NMP0167
December 21, 1937 "The Imperial Japanese Embassy"

Letter from Foreign Community of Nanking to Japanese Embassy
NMP0168
December 21, 1937 "Dear Dr. Bates"

Letter to Bates from S.T. ?
NMP0169
December 22, 1937 "American Consulate General"

Telegram from American Consulate General
NMP0170
December 24, 1937 "The Japanese Embassy"

Letter from Hubert L Sone, Chairman Property Committee of Nanking

Theological Seminary, to Japanese Embassy
NMP0171
December 25, 1937 "To the Officers of the Imperial Japanese Embassy"

Letter from Lewis Smythe, Secretary of the Safety Zone, to Japanese

Embassy
NMP0172
December 25, 1937 "Dear Dr. Bates"

Letter from S.T. ? to Dr. Bates
NMP0173
December 26, 1937 "International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone"

Letter from Lewis Smythe, Secretary of the Safety Zone, to Japanese

Embassy"
NMP0174
December 26 - 30, 1937 "International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone"

Collection of letters from Safety Zone to Japanese Embassy
NMP0175
December 27, 1937 "International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone"

Letter from John Rabe, Chairman of the Safety Zone Committee, to

Japanese Embassy
NMP0176
December 28, 1937 "The Sin Shun Pao"

Translation of an article written in the Sin Shun Pao in Shanghai
NMP0177
December 31, 1937 "Memorandum of Interview Regarding Wang Hsing-Lung

Case"



RG 10: Box 102 Folder 865: Nanking during Sino-Japanese conflict 1938 Jan.
NMP0178
New Year greeting card from International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone
NMP0179
"List of documents for Nanking Safety Zone: Japanese Period"
NMP0180
"Archicol New York"

Report from Bates to New York and Indianapolis
NMP0181
January 3, 1938 "Position of the International Committee"

Five goals of the Safety Zone Committee
NMP0182
January 1, 1938 "Memorandum on Coal Stock, No. 2"
NMP0183
January 6, 1938 "Hsin Sun Pao"

Newspaper article translated by Bates
NMP0184
January 6, 1938 "International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone"

Letter from John Rabe, Chair of Safety Zone, to Japanese Army Supply

Department
NMP0185
January 7, 1938 "The American Embassy"

Letter from Lewis Smythe to American Embassy in Nanking
NMP0186
January 7, 1938 "International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone

Letter from John Rabe, Chair of Safety Zone, to Japanese Army Supply

Department
NMP0187
January 7, 1938 "United Christian Missionary Society"

Letter from Mae to friends
NMP0188
January 8, 1938 "Sin Shun Pao"

Newspaper article translated by "S", "Japanese Troops Soothe the Refugees
NMP0189
January 8, 1938 "To Allison at his request"

NMP0190
January 12, 1938 "Suggested Position as to Search, Seizure and Intimidation"

Notes by Bates on foreign property in Nanking
NMP0191
January 14, 1938 "Mr. Tokuyasa Fukuda"

Letter from John Rabe, Chair of Safety Zone, to Tokuyasa Fukuda of the

Japanese Embassy
NMP0192
January 15, 1938 "Consulate-General Hankow"

Telegram from Bates to Priest
NMP0193
January 15, 1938 "International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone"

Letter from John Rabe, Chair of Safety Zone, to Japanese Embassy in

Nanking
NMP0194
January 17, 1938 "International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone"

Letter from John Rabe, Chair of Safety Zone, to Japanese Embassy in

Nanking
NMP0195
January 22, 1938 "International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone"

Letter from Lewis Smythe to Mr. C. L. Boynton, National Christian

Council
NMP0196
January 29, 1938 "The following is an extraction..."

Notes on situation in Nanking and letter from Refugees to International

Safety Zone Committee
NMP0197
January 31, 1938 "Notes on Present Situation in Nanking"



RG 10: Box 102 Folder 866: Nanking during Sino-Japanese conflict 1938 Feb.
NMP0198
1938 "Classes and Meetings for Refugees in University Main Buildings"
NMP0199
"German Consulate General, Shanghai"

Telegram from John Rabe to German Consulate General (IN GERMAN)
NMP0200
February 1, 1938 "Dear Mr. Boynton"

Letter from Bates to Mr. Boynton (National Christian Council)
NMP0201
February 3, 1938 "Mr. Hidaka"

Letter from John Rabe, Chair of Safety Zone, to Mr. Hidaka of the Japanese

Embassy
NMP0202
February 3, 1938 "Notes on the Present Situation"

Notes written by Bates on situation in Nanking
NMP0203
February 4, 1938 "Naval radio"

Telegram from US Secretary of State Hull to Bates
NMP0204
February 6, 1938 "Mr. John M. Allison"

Letter from John Rabe to Mr. Allison at the American Embassy
NMP0205
February 8, 1938 "Matsui Orders Tightening of Army Discipline"

Article from the China Press
NMP0206
February 10, 1938 "Extract from Letter from Miss J.T. to Mrs. L.B"
NMP0207
February 10, 1938 "Relief Problems in Nanking upon which Cooperation of Japanese Authorities is Especially Urgent"
NMP0208
February 14, 1938 "Relief Situation in Nanking"
NMP0209
February 19, 1938 "Nanking International Relief Committee"

Letter from John Rabe to Shanghai Nanking Relief Association, Attn: Rev.

P.F. Price, Chairman
NMP0210
February 21, 1938 "Address of John Rabe at Farewell Party by Staff of Nanking Safety Zone"
NMP0211
February 21, 1938 "John Rabe..."

General thank you letter from John Rabe to American, German, Japanese

and British Embassy representatives
NMP0212
February 22, 1938 "Memorandum on Relief Problem in Nanking"
NMP0213
Winter 1938 "Preliminary report on Christian work in Nanking"
NMP0214
February 24, 1938 "Refugees in the Occupied Areas"

Translated newspaper article from Sin Shun Pao



RG 10: Box 102 Folder 867: Nanking during Sino-Japanese conflict 1938 March
NMP0215
1938 "Notes on Methods and Procedure for Economic Inquiry"

Survey of damages surrounding Safety Zone
NMP0216
March 1, 1938 "Draft for Economic Inquiry"

Introduction to Survey of damages surrounding Safety Zone
NMP0217
March 1, 1938 "Notes on Present Situation"
NMP0218
March 2, 1938 "Nanking International Relief Committee"

Letter from W.P. Mills, Vice-Chair of Safety Zone, to Lieutenant-Colonel

Hirota
NMP0219
March 2, 1938 "From Nanking Gazette (Nanking Kung Pao)"

Article translated by Bates about Tao His-San"s lost Buddhist relics
NMP0220
March 3, 1938 "Notes on the Present Situation"

Notes about Nanking compiled by Bates
NMP0221
March 3, 1938 "Introduction to Notes on Nanking Economics"
NMP0222
March 3, 1938 "Nanking International Relief Committee" (2 pages)

Letter from Lewis Smythe, Secretary of Safety Zone Committee, to China

International Famine Relief Commission
NMP0223
March 10, 1938 "Nanking People"s News"

Article translated by Bates
NMP0224
"Nanking Today"

Report by W.P. Mills, Vice-Chairman of the Safety Zone Committee, on

specific incident with family of Ts"ai Pang Hseng
NMP0225
March 21, 1938 "Notes on the Present Situation"
NMP0226
March 21, 1938 "Notes on German Atrocities in Belgium"

Comparison between German atrocities in Belgium in WWI and Japanese

atrocities in Nanking
NMP0227
March 29, 1938 "Naval Radio"

Telegram from Mrs. Bates to Bates
NMP0228
March 31, 1938 "The Spirit of the new Reconstruction"

A translation of a Japanese army poster
NMP0229
March 31, 1938 "Conversation of Consul Tanaka with Bates"
NMP0230
March 1938 "Results of Investigation of 13,530 families who applied for relief during March"
NMP0231
February and March 1938 "Reports of the Rehabilitation Commission of the International Relief Committee"



RG 10: Box 102 Folder 868: Nanking during Sino-Japanese conflict 1938 April-Nov
NMP0232
December 1937 "List of Documents Regarding Rice and Flour Assigned to the International Committee by the Mayor of Nanking but held by the Japanese Military Authorities" (2 pages)
NMP0233
April 13, 1938 "Nanking International Relief Committee" (3 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills, Vice-Chair of the Safety Zone Committee, to

Yoshiyuki Hanawa, the Consul-General of Japan
NMP0234
April 28, 1938 "The Spirit of the New Reconstruction"

A translation of Japanese army poster
NMP0235
May 13, 1938 "Item from Report of Ginling College Refugee Camp"

Incident report by Minnie Vautrin
NMP0236
May 13, 1938 "Dear Doctor Imai" (2 pages)

Letter from Lewis Smythe to Dr. Imai
NMP0237
May 13, 1938 "Dear Doctor Imai" (3 pages)

Follow-up letter from Lewis Smythe to Dr. Imai
NMP0238
June 20, 1938 "Nanking International Relief Committee" (9 pages)

Letter from Lewis Smythe to Dr. John Earle Baker of Shanghai
NMP0239
April 23, 1938 "Nanking International Relief Committee"

Letter from Lewis Smythe to Dr. G Rosen, German Embassy, Mr. E.W.

Jeffery, British Embassy and Mr. John M. Allison, American Embassy
NMP0240
April 30, 1938 "War Relief in Nanking" (2 pages)

Report on relief efforts
NMP0241
April 1938 "War Relief in Nanking" (2 pages)

Report on relief efforts
NMP0242
May 14, 1938 "Considerations in Determining the Program of the International Relief Committee" (2 pages)
NMP0243
May 1938 "Nanking International Relief Committee"

The results of investigation of 52,539 families who applied for relief from

February to May 1938
NMP0244
August 3, 1938 "Dear Lewis"

Letter from George Fitch to Lewis Smythe
NMP0245
September 10, 1938 "Scraps of Economic Information" (2 pages)
NMP0246
September 10, 1938 "Dear Sir"

Letter from International Committee to Mr. S. Hidaka of the Japanese

Embassy in Shaghai
NMP0247
November 1, 1938 "Work and Program of the Nanking International Relief Committee" (4 pages)
NMP0248
November 1937 - April 30, 1938 "Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee" (23 pages)

Booklet compilation of reports made by the International Relief Committee



RG 10: Box 102 Folder 869: Nanking during Sino-Japanese conflict 1939
NMP0249
Booklet by Lewis Smythe, "War damage in the Nanjing area, Dec. 1937" (41 pages)



RG 10: Box 102 Folder 870: Nanking during Sino-Japanese conflict 1940-1941
NMP0250
1938-1939 "Japanese propaganda flyers" (3 pages)
NMP0251
1939-40 "Relief in Nanking is grim..."

Notes on the relief work in Nanking
NMP0252
1940 "Suggested Plan for Survey of Family Records" (3 pages)
NMP0253
Winter-Spring 1940 "Selections from Report of Survey, based on Families Relieved Winter-Spring 1940"
NMP0254
September 25, 1940 "Nanking International Relief Committee - Summary Program"

NMP0255
October 12, 1940 "Dear Hall"

Letter to Hall listing shipping restrictions between Nanking and Shanghai
NMP0256
May 1, 1939 - April 30, 1941 "Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee" (5 pages)
NMP0257
1941 "Nanking - Record of Average Retail Prices"
NMP0258
1941 "Price Changes In Percentage"



RG 10: Box 102 Folder 871: Nanking during Sino-Japanese conflict n.d.
NMP0259
"Brothels are Political Tools in "The New Order in East Asia"" (2 pages)

Photograph of Japanese army poster advertising brothel in Nanking. Poster

appeared in the Eve Post in Japan and has been translated here.
NMP0260
47 pages of miscellaneous documents related to the International Relief Committee



RG 10: Box 103 Folder 874: G. Political + religious situation 1937-1938
NMP0261
Sept. 1937 "Secret Japanese Press Laws in North China..." (4 pages)
NMP0262
Jan. 11, 1938 "Dear Mr. Paul" (14 pages)

Letter from Edwin Marx, Mission Secretary, to Mr. Paul
NMP0263
January 21, 1938 "China News Letter, Dear Friends of the China Mission" (8 pages)

Letters from Phillips House to friends in the United States



RG 10: Box 103 Folder 875: G. Political + religious situation 1939, (1930s?)
NMP0264
Jan. 1, 1939 "A Miscellany of Slogans and Similar..." (9 pages)

Summary of Japanese army slogans
NMP0265
"Political and Economic Conditions in the Occupied Areas of East Central China" (8 pages)
NMP0266
October 14, 1939 "American Advisory Committee on Civilian Relief in China"

Letter from International Committee to the American Advisory Committee

on Civilian Relief in China and the British Fund for China Relief
NMP0267
1930"s (?) "Japan"s Cultural Invasion of China" (9 pages)

Study on Japanese propaganda
NMP0268
1930"s (?) "Japanese Propaganda in the Mirror of Events" (4 pages)



RG 10: Box 87 Folder 682: A. J
NMP0269
November, 1937 "Japan"s Great Adventure" (8 pages)

Article written by Bates in November 1937 for the New York Times.

Rejected as too heavy, but used in State Department and special groups



RG 10: Box 87 Folder 684: A. L
NMP0270
May, 1938 "To the Editor of the North-China Daily News" (3 pages)

Letter from Bates to the editor of the North China Daily News



RG 10: Box 87 Folder 690: A. National/Public/Social Affairs series from China Missions Newsletter 1935-1950, n.d.
NMP0271
April 5, 1936 "National Affairs" (2 pages)
NMP0272
May, 1936 "National Affairs" (2 pages)
NMP0273
June, 1936 "National Affairs (2 pages)
NMP0274
July 10, 1936 "National Affairs" (2 pages)
NMP0275
Sept. 19, 1936 "National Affairs" (2 pages)
NMP0276
Oct. 1936 "National Affairs" (2 pages)
NMP0277
Nov. 1936 "National Affairs"
NMP0278
Dec. 1936 "National Affairs"
NMP0279
Feb. 1937 "National Affairs"(2 pages)
NMP0280
March 6, 1937 "National Affairs"
NMP0281
April, 1937 "National Affairs"
NMP0282
May 1937 "National Affairs"
NMP0283
June 6, 1937 "National Affairs"
NMP0284
August 1937 "National Affairs" (2 pages)
NMP0285
Oct. 1, 1937 "National Affairs" (2 pages)
NMP0286
Nov. 10, 1937 "National Affairs" (2 pages)
NMP0287
December, 1937 "National Affairs" (2 pages)
NMP0288
June 14, 1938 "Public Affairs" (2 pages)
NMP0289
November, 1938 "Public Affairs" (2 pages)



RG 10: Box 126 Folder 1132: Curriculum vitae, biographical sketches
NMP0290
Undated CV of Dr. Miner Searle Bates (by Union Theological Seminary)


Part 4
China Records Project Miscellaneous Personal Papers Collections, Record Group No. 8 - W. Plumer Mills papers



RG 8: Box 141 Folder 11: Mills, W. Plumer - Correspondence to family Jan 3-10, 1938
NMP0291
January 3, 1938 "Dear Nina"

Letter from W.P. Mills to his wife, Nina
NMP0292
January 9, 1938 "Dear Nina" (2 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to his wife, Nina
NMP0293
January 10, 1938 "Dear Nina" (10 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to his wife, Nina



RG 8: Box 141 Folder 12: Mills, W. Plumer - Correspondence to family Jan 19 - Feb 9, 1938
NMP0294
January 19, 1938 "Dear Family" (9 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to Seyle family
NMP0295
January 22, 1938 "Dear Nina" (4 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to his wife, Nina
NMP0296
January 31, 1938 "Dear Nina" (2 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to his wife, Nina
NMP0297
February 3, 1938 "Dear Nina" (3 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to his wife, Nina
NMP0298
February 9, 1938 "Dear Nina" (4 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to his wife, Nina



RG 8: Box 141 Folder 13: Mills, W. Plumer - Correspondence to family Feb 19 - 26, 1938
NMP0299
February 19, 1938 "Dear Angie" (2 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to his daughter, Angie
NMP0300
February 20, 1938 "Dear Mary" (4 pages)

Letter from Cornelia Mills to Mary Mills
NMP0301
February 22, 1938 "Dear Nina" (2 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to his wife, Nina
NMP0302
February 26, 1938 "Dear Mary"

Letter from Cornelia Mills to Mary Mills



RG 8: Box 141 Folder 14: Mills, W. Plumer - Correspondence to family March 2-3, 1938, Feb. 26, Enclosed notes of MS Bates
NMP0303
February 26, 1938 "Dear Nina" (3 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to his wife, Nina
NMP0304
March 2, 1938 "Dear Nina" (2 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to his wife, Nina
NMP0305
March 3, 1938 "Dear Nina" (2 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to his wife, Nina



RG 8: Box 141 Folder 15: Mills, W. Plumer - Correspondence to family March 9-20, 1938 Letter of H. Maxcy Smith incl. talk by John Rabe
NMP0306
February 28, 1938 "Tiffin - Foreign YMCA - Shanghai" (3 pages)

Talk by John Rabe in Shanghai
NMP0307
March 17, 1938 "Dear Mary"

Letter from H. Maxcy Smith, American Presbyterian Mission, to Mary

Mills
NMP0308
March 9, 1938 "Dear Nina" (2 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to his wife, Nina
NMP0309
March 12, 1938 "Dear Mary" (2 pages)

Letter from Cornelia Mills to Mary Mills
NMP0310
March 13, 1938 "Dear Harriet" (2 pages)

Letter from Cornelia Mills to Harriet Mills



RG 8: Box 141 Folder 16: Mills, W. Plumer - Correspondence to family March 18, 31, 1938
NMP0311
March 18, 1938 "Dear Nina" (2 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to his wife, Nina
NMP0312
March 31, 1938 "Dear Mary" (2 pages)

Letter from Cornelia Mills to Mary Mills



China Records Project Miscellaneous Personal Papers Collections, Record Group No. 8 - Anna Moffett Jarvis Papers



RG 8: Box 103 Folder 2: Jarvis, Anna Moffett - Typescript compilation of letters: "Letters from China 1920-1949
NMP0313
June 14, 1936 - 1938 "Letters from China: Pages 18-25" (8 pages)

Letters written by Anna Moffett Jarvis



RG 8: Box 103 Folder 3: Jarvis, Anna Moffett - Corres: Circular letters 1937
NMP0314
"Notes with a copy of correspondence between the University of Nanking and the Japanese Embassy, 16-27 December, 1937"

NMP0315
"Copies of letters sent by the Chairman of the Emergency Committee of the University of Nanking to the Japanese Embassy, Nanking, from December 16 to 27 inclusive" (7 pages)
NMP0316
December 20, 1937 "Dearest Mardie, Chicks and Folks" (29 pages)

Anna Moffett Jarvis diary from December 12, 1937 - Jan. 9, 1938



RG 8: Box 103 Folder 4: Jarvis, Anna Moffett
NMP0317
Jan. 4, 1938 "Dear Ruth" (3 pages)

Letter from Minnie Vautrin to Ruth Chester
NMP0318
Jan. 8, 1938 "Dear Mr. Fukuda"

Letter from Lewis Smythe to Tekuyasa Fukuda of the Japanese Embassy
NMP0319
Jan. 10, 1938 "Dear Ruth and Florence" (4 pages)

Letter from Minnie Vautrin to Ruth Chester and Florence
NMP0320
January 10, 1938 "Dear Friends" (4 pages)

Letter from M.S. Bates to friends
NMP0321
January 15, 1938 "Dear Mr. Allison" (2 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to J.M. Allison
NMP0322
January 24, 1938 "Dear Nina (Mrs. W.P Mills) (3 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to his wife, Nina
NMP0323
February 2, 1938 "Telegram Received from Nanking"

Telegram from John Rabe to Han Lih Wu
NMP0324
February 12, 1938 "Extracts from letters from Margaret Winslett (4 pages)

Diary entries of Margaret Winslett, a teacher in Bible Teachers Training

School in Nanking
NMP0325
February 14, 1938 "Dear Peter Shih (YMCA) (2 pages)

Letter from George Fitch to Peter Shih of the YMCA
NMP0326
March 8, 1938 "Dear Friends in God"s Country" (10 pages)

Letter from Lewis and Margaret Smythe to the U.S.
NMP0327
April 17, 1938 "Dear Friends" (2 pages)

Letter from W.P. Mills to friends
NMP0328
April 29, 1938 "Dear Mr. Shelton" (3 pages)

Letter from Lewis Smythe to Williard K. Shelton, Editor of the Christian

Evangelist, St. Louis, Mo.



RG 8: Box 103 Folder 6: Jarvis, Anna Moffett - Typescript reports, 1937, 1938, 1941, 1942
NMP0329
Informal Report to the Board of Founders, Board of Directors, President Wu, Mrs. Thurston..." (11 double-sided pages)

Report written by Minnie Vautrin to the Board of Founders, Directors and

President of Ginling Women"s College
NMP0330
November 22, 1937 - April 15, 1938 "Nanking International Relief Committee Report of Activities" (4 pages)
NMP0331
"Faculty Report of Nanking Theological Seminary" (4 pages)

Report from Handel Lee, President of the Nanking Theological Seminary



China Records Project: Miscellaneus Personal Papers Collection, Record Group No. 8 - Ernest & Clarissa Forster Papers



RG 8: Box 263 Folder 1: Forster, Ernest & Clarissa - from disbound scrapbook - letters, clippings, ephemera
NMP0332
"Dear Friends" (2 double-sided pages)

Newsletter from Minnie Vautrin to friends of Ginling Women"s College



RG 8: Box 263 Folder 2: Forster, Ernest & Clarissa - from disbound scrapbook - letters, clippings, ephemera
NMP0333
December 7, 1937 "Dear Family" (2 pages)

Letter from Clarissa and Ernest Forster to family
NMP0334
December 12, 1937 "Darling" (26 pages)

Letter from John Magee to his wife
NMP0335
January 6, 1938 "Letter from Dr. George Fitch" (4 pages)

Letter from George Fitch to friends
NMP0336
January 14, 1938 "Dear"

Letter from Ernest Forster to his family
NMP0337
January 11, 1938 "Dear Billy" (4 pages)

Letter from John Magee



RG 8: Box 263 Folder 3: Forster, Ernest & Clarissa - from disbound scrapbook - letters, clippings, ephemera
NMP0338
1936 "A Day-Or More" (booklet)

Brief Guide Book to Nanking in English
NMP0339
December 16, 1937 "Dear Family" (2 pages)

Anonymous letter
NMP0340
December 16 - 27, 1937 "Notes with a copy of correspondence between the University of Nanking and the Japanese Embassy" (7 pages)



RG 8: Box 263 Folder 4: Forster, Ernest & Clarissa - from disbound scrapbook - letters, clippings, ephemera
NMP0341
August 20, 1937 "Dear Ernest"

Letter from John Magee to Ernest Forster
NMP0342
August 26, 1937 "Dear Ernest"

Letter from John Magee to Ernest Forster

RG 8: Box 263 Folder 6: Forster, Ernest & Clarissa - from disbound scrapbook - letters, clippings, ephemera
NMP0343
"Introduction" (24 pages)

Introduction to a film series and descriptions of each photograph



RG 8: Box 263 Folder 8: Forster, Ernest & Clarissa - from disbound scrapbook - letters, clippings, ephemera
NMP0344
March 28, 1938 Chinese newspaper article
NMP0345
February 10, 1938 "Dear" (2 pages)

Letter from Ernest Forster to his wife, Clarissa
NMP0346
February 10, 1938 "Dear Bishop"

Letter from Ernest Forster to Bishop in Shanghai
NMP0347
February 17, 1938 "Dear"

Letter from Ernest Forster to his wife, Clarissa
NMP0348
March 10, 1938 "Gentlemen" (3 pages)

Letter from Ernest Forster to American Embassy staff in Nanking
NMP349
March 16, 1938 "Dear Friends" (4 pages)

Letter from Ernest and Clarissa Forster to friends in the US
NMP0350
May 6, 1938 "Dear" (2 pages)

Letter from Ernest Forster to his wife, Clarissa
NMP0351
"Nanking" (10 pages)

Paper on relationship between Christians and citizens of Nanking in 1938,

written by John Magee and Ernest Forster
NMP0352
February 18, 1938 "Preliminary Report on Christian Work in Nanking - Winter 1937" (1 double-sided page + 1 page)

Prepared by Bates and W.P. Mills



RG 8: Box 263 Folder 9: Forster, Ernest & Clarissa - from disbound scrapbook - letters, clippings, ephemera
NMP0353
November 23 - December 14, 1937 "Nanking" (8 pages)

Collection of diary entries from Clarissa Forster
NMP0354
December 19, 1937 - January 28, 1938 "Mr. Forster"s letters to his wife" (14 pages)

A collection of letters from Ernest Forster to his wife, Clarissa
NMP0355
January 24 - February 13, 1938 "Mr. Forster"s Letters" (12 pages)

A collection of diary entries from Ernest Forster



Part 5
From papers of Minnie Vautrin in Record Groups No. 8 & 11, and microfilm Ms 62
http://divinity-adhoc.library.yale.edu/Nanking/Vautrin.pdf
  1. Microfilmed collection of Vautrin papers includes her diary (1937-1940), correspondence and newsclippings.
Last modified: Wednesday, January 27, 2016 - 4:01pm

http://web.library.yale.edu/divinity/nanking/photographs

https://historyofjapan.wordpress.com/2016/03/26/episode-141-nanjing-part-1/


This is from: http://www.history.com/topics/nanjing-massacre

Episode 142 – Nanjing, Part 1

ON MARCH 26, 2016IJMEYERIN HISTORY, JAPAN, UNCATEGORIZED

NOTE: Though there is substantial photographic evidence of the massacre, I am not going to post it directly on the site. If you want to see what things looked like on the ground, you can do so via websites like this one, curated by Yale University. However, I know not everybody wants to see those images, so I will not post those images directly.
On a related note, this episode contains graphic discussion of murder and rape. Listener discretion is advised.
———————————————-
This week, we look at the events of the Nanjing Massacre. Just what happened in China’s capital city in December, 1937?
Listen to the episode here.
Sources
Yoshida, Takashi. The Making of the Rape of Nanking.
Lu, Suping. They Were In Nanjing: The Nanjing Massacre as Witnessed by American and British Nationals.
Fogel, Joshua. The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography.
Images

Shanghai1937KMT_machine_gun_nest
Shanghai1937KMT_machine_gun_nest
Chinese defenders of the National Revolutionary Army (Chiang Kaishek’s elite forces) defending Shanghai, 1937. The Battle of Shanghai was supposed to be a Japanese walkover, but ended up lasting more than a month.
220px-Iwane_Matsui
220px-Iwane_Matsui
General Matsui Iwane, commander of the forces which entered Nanjing. Ironically, he was chosen for his position because of his supposed Pan-Asianist views and rapport with the Chinese.
220px-Iwane_Matsui_rides_into_Nanjing
220px-Iwane_Matsui_rides_into_Nanjing
Matsui entering Nanjing, December 13, 1937.
220px-HIH_Prince_Asaka_Yasuhiko
220px-HIH_Prince_Asaka_Yasuhiko
Prince Asaka Yasuhiko, the nominal commander of the Central China Area Army. A fascist to the core, Asaka was sent to China to get him out of the way.
Nanking_Safety_Zone_map
Nanking_Safety_Zone_map
The rough area of the Nanjing Safety Zone about 2 sq. miles total.
RoW-14
RoW-14
Refugees waiting for aid in the Nanjing Safety Zone. Courtesy of Yale University.
ff20071206r1b
ff20071206r1b
Chinese children huddled in the safety zone. Courtesy of Yale University.
1-eqUHL_M9k7PPVvu8YAD-HQ
1-eqUHL_M9k7PPVvu8YAD-HQ
John Rabe, the Nazi Party member who led the Safety Zone committee. Rabe was chosen because of the close relations between Germany and Japan, which might facilitate Japanese respect for the zone.
93627931_134239757334
93627931_134239757334
Minnie Vautrin, an American who taught at Ginling College and who tried to protect Chinese women on its campus.
MVGROUP3
MVGROUP3
Vautrin with her students, c. 1934. She is sitting in the second row, ninth from the right.Advertisements






This if from: http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/nanking.htm

Rape of Nanking: 1937-1938  300,000 Deaths
Rape of Nanking: 1937-1938 300,000 Deaths

In December of 1937, the Japanese Imperial Army marched into China's capital city of Nanking and proceeded to murder 300,000 out of 600,000 civilians and soldiers in the city. The six weeks of carnage would become known as the Rape of Nanking and represented the single worst atrocity during the World War II era in either the European or Pacific theaters of war.
The actual military invasion of Nanking was preceded by a tough battle at Shanghai that began in the summer of 1937. Chinese forces there put up surprisingly stiff resistance against the Japanese Army which had expected an easy victory in China. The Japanese had even bragged they would conquer all of China in just three months. The stubborn resistance by the Chinese troops upset that timetable, with the battle dragging on through the summer into late fall. This infuriated the Japanese and whetted their appetite for the revenge that was to follow at Nanking.
After finally defeating the Chinese at Shanghai in November, 50,000 Japanese soldiers then marched on toward Nanking. Unlike the troops at Shanghai, Chinese soldiers at Nanking were poorly led and loosely organized. Although they greatly outnumbered the Japanese and had plenty of ammunition, they withered under the ferocity of the Japanese attack, then engaged in a chaotic retreat. After just four days of fighting, Japanese troops smashed into the city on December 13, 1937, with orders issued to "kill all captives."
Their first concern was to eliminate any threat from the 90,000 Chinese soldiers who surrendered. To the Japanese, surrender was an unthinkable act of cowardice and the ultimate violation of the rigid code of military honor drilled into them from childhood onward. Thus they looked upon Chinese POWs with utter contempt, viewing them as less than human, unworthy of life.
The elimination of the Chinese POWs began after they were transported by trucks to remote locations on the outskirts of Nanking. As soon as they were assembled, the savagery began, with young Japanese soldiers encouraged by their superiors to inflict maximum pain and suffering upon individual POWs as a way of toughening themselves up for future battles, and also to eradicate any civilized notions of mercy. Filmed footage and still photographs taken by the Japanese themselves document the brutality. Smiling soldiers can be seen conducting bayonet practice on live prisoners, decapitating them and displaying severed heads as souvenirs, and proudly standing among mutilated corpses. Some of the Chinese POWs were simply mowed down by machine-gun fire while others were tied-up, soaked with gasoline and burned alive.


Maps & Photo
external image t-map-china.jpg
Present day map of China showing location of Shanghai and Nanking (now called Nanjing).
external image t-map-japan.jpg
Map of the Japanese Empire at its peak in 1942.
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One of the last humans left alive after intense bombing during the Japanese attack on Shanghai's South Station. August 1937.

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After the destruction of the POWs, the soldiers turned their attention to the women of Nanking and an outright animalistic hunt ensued. Old women over the age of 70 as well as little girls under the age of 8 were dragged off to be sexually abused. More than 20,000 females (with some estimates as high as 80,000) were gang-raped by Japanese soldiers, then stabbed to death with bayonets or shot so they could never bear witness.
Pregnant women were not spared. In several instances, they were raped, then had their bellies slit open and the fetuses torn out. Sometimes, after storming into a house and encountering a whole family, the Japanese forced Chinese men to rape their own daughters, sons to rape their mothers, and brothers their sisters, while the rest of the family was made to watch.
Throughout the city of Nanking, random acts of murder occurred as soldiers frequently fired their rifles into panicked crowds of civilians, killing indiscriminately. Other soldiers killed shopkeepers, looted their stores, then set the buildings on fire after locking people of all ages inside. They took pleasure in the extraordinary suffering that ensued as the people desperately tried to escape the flames by climbing onto rooftops or leaping down onto the street.
The incredible carnage - citywide burnings, stabbings, drownings, strangulations, rapes, thefts, and massive property destruction - continued unabated for about six weeks, from mid-December 1937 through the beginning of February 1938. Young or old, male or female, anyone could be shot on a whim by any Japanese soldier for any reason. Corpses could be seen everywhere throughout the city. The streets of Nanking were said to literally have run red with blood.
Those who were not killed on the spot were taken to the outskirts of the city and forced to dig their own graves, large rectangular pits that would be filled with decapitated corpses resulting from killing contests the Japanese held among themselves. Other times, the Japanese forced the Chinese to bury each other alive in the dirt.
After this period of unprecedented violence, the Japanese eased off somewhat and settled in for the duration of the war. To pacify the population during the long occupation, highly addictive narcotics, including opium and heroin, were distributed by Japanese soldiers to the people of Nanking, regardless of age. An estimated 50,000 persons became addicted to heroin while many others lost themselves in the city's opium dens.
In addition, the notorious Comfort Women system was introduced which forced young Chinese women to become slave-prostitutes, existing solely for the sexual pleasure of Japanese soldiers.
News reports of the happenings in Nanking appeared in the official Japanese press and also in the West, as page-one reports in newspapers such as the New York Times. Japanese news reports reflected the militaristic mood of the country in which any victory by the Imperial Army resulting in further expansion of the Japanese empire was celebrated. Eyewitness reports by Japanese military correspondents concerning the sufferings of the people of Nanking also appeared. They reflected a mentality in which the brutal dominance of subjugated or so-called inferior peoples was considered just. Incredibly, one paper, the Japan Advertiser, actually published a running count of the heads severed by two officers involved in a decapitation contest, as if it was some kind of a sporting match.
In the United States, reports published in the New York Times, Reader's Digest and Time Magazine, were greeted with skepticism from the American public. The stories smuggled out of Nanking seemed almost too fantastic to be believed.
Overall, most Americans had only a passing knowledge or little interest in Asia. Political leaders in both America and Britain remained overwhelmingly focused on the situation in Europe where Adolf Hitler was rapidly re-arming Germany while at the same time expanding the borders of the Nazi Reich through devious political maneuvers.
Back in Nanking, however, all was not lost. An extraordinary group of about 20 Americans and Europeans remaining in the city, composed of missionaries, doctors and businessmen, took it upon themselves to establish an International Safety Zone. Using Red Cross flags, they brazenly declared a 2.5 square-mile area in the middle of the city off limits to the Japanese. On numerous occasions, they also risked their lives by personally intervening to prevent the execution of Chinese men or the rape of women and young girls.
These Westerners became the unsung heroes of Nanking, working day and night to the point of exhaustion to aid the Chinese. They also wrote down their impressions of the daily scenes they witnessed, with one describing Nanking as "hell on earth." Another wrote of the Japanese soldiers: "I did not imagine that such cruel people existed in the modern world." About 300,000 Chinese civilians took refuge inside their Safety Zone. Almost all of the people who did not make it into the Zone during the Rape of Nanking ultimately perished.



Nanking Documentary https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jfkk-GtM_sI
Extremely rare footage https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MVRBPGe2k94

Alternative Japanese view
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-5ItfKF_RY


This information has come from Iris Chang's book The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, Basic Books, 1997.

INTRODUCTION:
...Americans think of World War Ii as beginning on December 7, 1941, when Japanese carrier-based airplanes attacked Pearl Harbor. Europeans date if from September 1, 1939, and the blitzkrieg assault on Poland by Hitler's Luftwaffe and Panzer divisions. Africans see an even earlier beginning, the invasion of Ethiopia by Mussolini in 1935. Yet Asians must trace the war's beginnings all the way back to Japan's first steps towards the military domination of East Asia - the occupation of Manchuria in 1931.

Just as Hitler's Germany would do half a decade later, Japan used a highly developed military machine and a master-race mentality to set about establishing its right to rule its neighbours. Manchuria fell quickly to the Japanese, who established their government of Manchukuo,, ostensibly under their puppet, the deposed emperor of China, but in fact run by the Japanese military. Four years later, in 1935, parts of Chahar and Hopeh were occupied; in 1937 Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, and finally Nanking fell. ...

...we do know the story of Nanking because some foreigners witnessed the horror and sent word to the outside world at the time, and some Chinese survived as eyewitnesses. If one event can be held up as an example of the unmitigated evil lying just below the surface of unbridled military adventurism, that moment is the Rape of Nanking.

...The broad details of the Rape are, except among the Japanese, not in dispute. In November 1937, after their successful invasion of Shanghai, the Japanese launched a massive attack on the newly established capital of the Republic of China. When the city fell on December 13, 1937, Japanese soldiers began an orgy of cruelty seldom if ever matched in world history. Tens of thousands of young men were rounded up and herded to the outer areas of the city, where they were mowed down by machine guns, used for bayonet practice, or soaked with gasoline and burned alive. For months the streets of the city were heaped with corpses and reeked with the stench of rotting human flesh. Years later experts at the International Military Tribunal of the Far East (IMTFE) estimated that more than 260,000 noncombatants died at the hands of Japanese soldiers at Nanking in late 1937 and early 1938, though some experts have placed the figure at well over 350,000.
...for its aim (This book) is not to establish a quantitative record to qualify the event as one of the great evil deeds of history, but to understand the event so that lessons can be learned and warnings sounded. ...

...It is certainly true that in the 20th century, when the tools of mass murder were fully refined, Hitler killed about 6 million Jews, and Stalin more than 40 million Russians, but these deaths were brought about over some few years. In the Rape of Nanking the killing was concentrated within a few weeks.

...the Rape of Nanking represents one of the worst instances of mass extermination. ...The death toll of Nanking-one Chinese city alone-exceeds the number of civilian casualties of some European countries for the entire [Second World] war. Great Britain lost a total of 61,000 civilians, France lost 108,000, Belgium 101,000, and the Netherlands 242,000. ...Indeed, whether we use the most conservative number - 260,000 - or the highest - 350,000 - it is shocking to contemplate that the deaths at Nanking far exceeded the deaths from the American raid on Tokyo (an estimated 80,000-120,000 deaths) and even the combined death toll of the two atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the end of 1945 (estimated at 140,000 and 70,000 respectively).

The Rape of Nanking should be remembered not only for the number of people slaughtered but for the cruel manner in which many met their deaths. Chinese men were used for bayonet practice and in decapitation contests. An estimated 20,000-80,000 Chinese women were raped. Many soldiers went beyond rape to disembowel women, slice off their breasts, nail them alive to walls. Fathers were forced to rape daughters, and sons their mothers, as other family members watched. Not only did live burials, castration, the carving of organs, and the roasting of people become routine, but more diabolical tortures were practiced, such as hanging people by their tongues on iron hooks or burying people to their waists and watching them get torn apart by German Shepherds. So sickening was the spectacle that even the Nazis in the city were horrified, one proclaiming the massacre to be the work of "bestial machinery."

Yet the Rape of Nanking remains an obscure incident. Unlike the atomic explosions in Japan or the Jewish Holocaust in Europe, the horrors of the massacre at Nanking remain virtually unknown to people outside Asia. ...Only in Robert Leckie's Delivered from Evil: The Saga of World War II (1987) did I find a single paragraph about the massacre: "Nothing the Nazis under Hitler would do to disgrace their own victories could rival the atrocities of Japanese soldiers under Gen. Iwane Matsui."

I first learned about the Rape of Nanking when I was a little girl. The stories came from my parents, who had survived years of war and revolution ...They had grown up in China in the midst of World War II and after the war fled with their families, first to Taiwan and finally to the United States to study at Harvard and pursue academic careers in science. ...But they never forgot the horrors of the Sino-Japanese War, not did they want me to forget. They particularly did not want me to forget the Rape of Nanking. Neither of my parents witnessed it, but as young children they had heard the stories, and these were passed down to me. The Japanese. I learned, sliced babies not just in half but in thirds and fourths, they said; the Yangtze River ran red with blood for days. Their voices quivering with outrage, my parents characterised the Great Nanking Massacre, or Nanjing Datusha, as the single most diabolical incident committed by the Japanese in a war that killed more than 10 million Chinese people.

Throughout my childhood Nanjing Datusha remained buried in the back of my mind as a metaphor for unspeakable evil. But the event lacked human details and human dimensions. It was also difficult to find the line between myth and history. ....If the Rape of Nanking was truly so gory, ...then why hadn't someone written a book about it?

...Nancy Tong, and independent filmmaker who had produced and codireted with Christine Choy In the name of the Emperor. Shao Tzuping and Nancy Tong helped plug me into a network of activits, many of them first-generation Chinese Americans and Chinese Canadians who, like me, felt the need to bear witness [talk about] the event, to document and publicise it,and even to seek restitution for the atrocities of Nanking before all the surviving victims passed away.